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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE 
OF RUNAWAY CAMPAIGN SPENDING: 
HOW MORE VIGILANT COURT ACTION 
AND STRONGER RECUSAL STATUTES 
CAN RECLAIM THE PERCEPTION OF AN 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 
“I never felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station in any 
race I’ve ever been in as I did in a judicial race. . . . Everyone 
interested in contributing has very specific interests. They mean to 
be buying a vote.” – Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul E. Pfeifer1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Pfeifer’s quotation illustrates a prominent dynamic in 
modern judicial elections: the involvement of interest groups, 
attorneys, and wealthy litigants who pledge substantial amounts of 
campaign money to judicial candidates in the hope that the candidates 
will later rule in their favor.2 This aspect of judicial campaigns leads 
                                                                                                                 
1 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1. Justice Pfeifer has experience as both a judicial candidate and a 
candidate for the state legislature, which makes his colorful remark about judicial campaigns 
and fundraising all the more telling. Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & 
THE OHIO JUDICIAL SYSTEM http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/SCO/justices/pfeifer/default.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  
2 Consider the view of an anonymous AFL-CIO official who offers the observation that 
“[w]e [the AFL-CIO] figured out a long time ago that it’s easier to elect seven judges than to 
elect 132 legislators.” JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000 
–2009: DECADE OF CHANGE 9 (2010) (footnote omitted). Some judicial campaign contributors 
provide money not to ensure a positive result for their interests, but to ensure that they are not 
harmed for failing to provide a contribution. See id. at 8 (recounting Texas Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Wallace B. Jefferson’s statement that “[w]hen you appear before a court, you ask how 
much your lawyer gave to the judge’s campaign. If the opposing counsel gave more, you are 
cynical.”); Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They’re Playing with a 
Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at A1 (recounting Nevada attorney Robert D. 
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to elected judges hearing cases that involve their campaign 
supporters,3 a practice that produces scenarios suggesting judicial 
bias.4 Unfortunately, such scenarios are the norm in the nation’s 
courtrooms. According to a New York Times review of campaign 
contributions and the outcomes of cases before the Ohio Supreme 
Court,5 justices “routinely” heard cases after receiving campaign 
contributions from either the parties to the cases or those filing 
amicus briefs in support of the parties.6 Furthermore, justices ruled in 
favor of their campaign contributors around 70 percent of the time 
and “almost never” recused themselves in these situations.7 
Moreover, at least one study has shown that state supreme court 
justices in many other jurisdictions have “routinely adjust[ed] their 
rulings to attract votes and campaign money,” which suggests that the 
Ohio Supreme Court is not an outlier.8  
The story of Duane Adams poignantly demonstrates the extent to 
which judicial independence is jeopardized by elected judges hearing 
cases that involve their campaign contributors. Adams was a plaintiff 
in a class-action lawsuit against DaimlerChrysler and Ford Motor 
Company for violations of Ohio’s lemon law.9 Adams leased a 1996 
Dodge10 that soon became “nothing but trouble” and made him feel 
unsafe.11 DaimlerChrysler gave Adams a refund for the car, but 
deducted over $6,000 from the refund for mileage that Adams put on 
                                                                                                                 
 
Vannah’s statement that “[g]iving money to a judge’s campaign means you’re less likely to get 
screwed . . . . A $1,000 contribution isn’t going to buy special treatment. It’s a hedge against 
bad things happening.”). 
3 This Note uses “campaign supporters” and “campaign contributors” as shorthand 
expressions for interest groups, attorneys, and litigants who are either (1) directly involved in 
litigation before an elected judge as attorneys of record or parties or (2) indirectly involved in 
litigation before an elected judge because the litigation implicates their interests. 
4 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, in THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
2000–2009: DECADE OF CHANGE, at i (2010) (“We all expect judges to be accountable to the 
law rather than political supporters or special interests. But elected judges in many states are 
compelled to solicit money for their election campaigns, sometimes from lawyers and parties 
appearing before them. [This creates] a crisis of confidence in the impartiality of the 
judiciary.”).  
5 Ohio holds elections for seats on the Ohio Supreme Court. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2503.02–2503.03 (West 2006) (providing for the elections of Ohio Supreme Court Justices in 
each even-numbered year and that of the Chief Justice every six years).  
6 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1. 
7 Id. The review indicated that the sitting justices of the Ohio Supreme Court in 2006 
only recused themselves in nine out of 215 cases involving their campaign contributors. Id. 
8 Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 625 
(2009).  
9 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1345.71 (West 2006).  
10 Maitland v. Ford Motor Co., 816 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ohio 2004). 
11 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.  
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the car.12 After an appeals court allowed the resulting lawsuit to move 
forward, the case went before the Ohio Supreme Court in May 
2004.13  
At that time, Justice Terrence O’Donnell was running for 
reelection, and, as part of that effort, DaimlerChrysler and Ford 
contributed a total of $1,500 to his campaign fund. 14 Furthermore, the 
law firms representing DaimlerChrysler and Ford chipped in 
$115,000 to the campaign committees of Chief Justice Thomas 
Moyer, Justice Maureen O’Connor, Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, 
and Justice O’Donnell.15 All of these donations occurred after the 
Supreme Court had granted review of Adams’s lawsuit.16  
Eight days after the 2004 election, Moyer, O’Connor, Lundberg 
Stratton, and the reelected O’Donnell17 voted for their campaign 
contributors by dismissing the class action lawsuit.18 Meanwhile, the 
three dissenters received campaign contributions from the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers.19 The result, combined with the campaign contributions, 
made Adams feel like the members of the majority “should be 
prosecuted for what I consider is taking a bribe.”20  
Adams’ lawsuit and the trends described in the New York Times 
article create the perception that state judicial systems lack 
independence.21 The public’s pessimistic view of judicial 
independence has only intensified in the past twenty years with the 
explosion of fundraising and campaign spending in judicial 
campaigns.22 Since public confidence is a prominent source for 
judicial credibility, policymakers and legal reformers must address 
                                                                                                                 
12 Maitland, 816 N.E.2d at 1064. 
13 Id. at 1061; Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.  
14 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 O’Donnell received 61 percent of the vote. Election and Ballot Issues: Justice of the 
Supreme Court – Unexpired Term: November 2, 2004, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2004ElectionsResults/04-
1102JusticeSupremeCourtUnexpired.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  
18 Maitland, 816 N.E.2d at 1068. 
19 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.  
20 Id.  
21 See Brief of Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2003) (No. 01–521), 2002 WL 257559 at 
*18 (“The States know that if candidates for judicial office appeal for voters’ support on the 
same basis as legislative candidates—if they answer to the same electoral majorities—the courts 
run the grave risk of becoming second legislatures. As electoral twins to the legislature, courts 
would stand to lose the essential independence required for them to discharge their high 
constitutional duty of judicial review.”); see also infra Part I.C (discussing the public’s lack of 
confidence in the judiciary). 
22 See infra Part I.B for a brief history of judicial fundraising. 
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the public’s negative perception as the crux of solving the judicial 
independence problem.23  
Although there are a variety of proposals to combat the perception 
of a judiciary biased by campaign contributions’ in states with elected 
judges, recusal is the most effective tool. A recusal-based solution 
would effectively prevent judges from hearing cases that involve their 
campaign supporters. Furthermore, it would be constitutionally 
sustainable, and would attract strong support from policymakers.24 
These characteristics place recusal at a distinct advantage over other 
commonly-proposed solutions that are either impractical or 
ineffective.25 
The law surrounding recusal, however, is extremely unsettled, 
leaving its potential to protect judicial independence unrealized.26 
Even the United States Supreme Court weighed in on judicial recusal 
in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company,27 but did little to clarify 
the law. The Court found that West Virginia Supreme Court Justice 
Brent Benjamin violated the Due Process Clause when he failed to 
recuse himself after receiving $3 million in campaign contributions 
from the owner of the defendant corporation, rendering him 
objectively biased towards the defendant.28 Although Caperton 
advances the cause of ensuring judicial independence in state systems 
through recusal, it does not create a workable standard for future 
cases. Furthermore, Caperton does not offer guidance on what judges 
should do when hearing less “exceptional” cases involving their 
campaign contributors.29 Most codified recusal rules similarly fail to 
create cognizable requirements that prevent elected judges from 
hearing “unexceptional” cases involving their campaign supporters.30  
The nebulous recusal standards articulated in Caperton and found 
in state statutory and ethics codes reflect our nation’s failure to 
adequately protect judicial independence. A two-prong remedy is 
necessary to protect judicial impartiality: (1) more vigilant action by 
                                                                                                                 
23 See infra Part I.A (describing the relationship between campaign fundraising and 
judicial decision making).  
24 See infra Part IV.A (arguing for a recusal-based solution).  
25 See infra Part III (highlighting the deficiencies of other remedies).  
26 RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION 
OF JUDGES § 1.5, at 13 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he theoretical underpinnings of American judicial 
disqualification jurisprudence remain murky and unsettled. In fact, modern American judicial 
disqualification case precedents are replete with inconsistencies which . . . raise troubling 
questions as to precisely how much impartiality a litigant has the right to reasonably expect of a 
judge.”) (footnotes omitted).  
27 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
28 Id. at 2263. For a more complete description of Caperton, see infra Part II.A.2.  
29 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. 
30 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing state recusal statutes with no specific reference to 
campaign contributions).  
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the Supreme Court and (2) stronger state statutes. The Court can 
accomplish the first prong by reading the Caperton standard 
expansively to include less exceptional facts. To effectuate this 
expansive reading, the Court should employ a presumption that, in the 
absence of contrary evidence showing a lack of bias on the judge’s 
part, the existence of a substantial campaign contribution by a litigant, 
attorney of record, or special interest group who has filed an amicus 
brief in support of one party necessitates a judge’s recusal. In 
accomplishing the second prong, states should follow Alabama and 
California’s lead31 and adopt laws requiring judges to recuse 
themselves when they hear cases involving their campaign 
contributors whose donations exceed a certain limit. 
This Note offers a justification for the above two-prong solution to 
the judicial independence problem in our state courts. In doing so, this 
Note addresses the current legal principles surrounding judicial 
recusal in state systems with elected judges, the impact of judicial 
campaigns and fundraising on those principles, and how those 
principles should be changed. Part I introduces the relationship 
between campaign contributions and judicial decision making, the 
amount of fundraising present in modern judicial campaigns, and the 
public’s perception of judicial independence. Part II then proceeds to 
discuss the current legal principles governing judicial recusal. This 
discussion focuses on three sources: the Supreme Court’s recusal 
jurisprudence, the states’ judicial ethics codes, and the states’ 
statutory codes. Next, Part III outlines various proposals offered to 
address the appearance of impropriety resulting from judges hearing 
their campaign supporters’ cases. Finally, Part IV presents the two 
prong recusal remedy needed to protect judicial independence. 
Implementing this remedy advocates that the Supreme Court read 
Caperton broadly, and that the states adopt recusal statutes similar to 
Alabama’s and California’s.  
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE EXPLOSION OF CAMPAIGN 
FUNDRAISING AND THE PERCEPTION OF JUDICIAL BIAS 
Before understanding the Supreme Court’s and state policymakers’ 
response to judicial recusal, it is necessary to first discuss the 
dynamics of modern judicial campaigns. The states’ current structure 
of judicial elections produces an environment that requires elected 
state judges to obtain contributions from interested parties and 
members of the bar. Such solicitation and acceptance of contributions 
                                                                                                                 
31 See infra Part II.B.3 for a more complete description of the Alabama and California 
statutes. 
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creates a troubling situation in which elected judges hear cases that 
involve their contributors.  
A. Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making 
The requisite threshold question in analyzing modern judicial 
campaigns is what relationship exists between campaign contributions 
and judicial decision making. Political science and legal commentary 
posit two primary viewpoints of this relationship: the quid-pro-quo 
view32 and the ideological-matching view.33 The quid-pro-quo view 
envisions the following situation. First, a judicial candidate runs for 
office and receives campaign contributions from individuals, 
members of the bar, and special interest groups. Then, the judicial 
candidate wins, assumes his or her role on the bench, and feels 
indebted to those who bankrolled his or her campaign. Finally, quid-
pro-quo advocates argue, the judge decides cases involving his or her 
campaign contributors based on the receipt of the contributions.34 The 
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have shown a 
willingness to accept the quid-pro-quo view of the relationship 
between campaign contributions and judicial decision making.35  
Conversely, the ideological-matching viewpoint imagines the 
following type of situation. A judge runs for reelection after acquiring 
a judicial record of sentencing convicted criminal defendants to 
                                                                                                                 
32 See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Campaigning for the Bench: The Corrosive Effects of 
Campaign Speech?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 899, 903 (2008) (“Contributions to candidates for 
judicial office imply for many a conflict of interest, even a quid pro quo relationship between 
the donor and the judge . . . .”).  
33 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Note, Modeling Campaign Contributions: The 
Market for Access and Its Implications for Regulation, 80 GEO. L.J. 1891, 1893 (1992) (“The 
traditional view is that individuals and groups contribute to candidates whose positions they 
support in order to increase the candidates' chances for election.”).  
34 See, e.g., PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE 
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 21 (1980) (“The requirement that judicial candidates campaign 
for election means that the successful candidate carries to the bench a list of obligations and 
favors owed. Where a position on the bench has been secured with the political, organizational, 
and financial assistance of party leaders, the judges ‘will find it almost impossible to resist 
completely the opportunities of his creditors for payment through judicial favors,’ including 
favorable treatment of certain litigants.”) (quoting LEWIS MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 386 (1964)); Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive 
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 278 
(2002) (“Elected judges may feel pressured to reward their supporters or be tempted to rule 
against those who do not support them. Likewise, the growing involvement of special interest 
groups in judicial campaigns may pressure a candidate to adopt the political or social agenda 
that arrives tied to a stack of cash.”).  
35 See Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes after Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 225 (2004) (stating that the Supreme Court has held that 
“campaign contributions raise the dangers of corruption – defined as candidate too compliant 
with the wishes of their donors – and appearance of corruption”).  
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shorter terms than those requested by the government.36 During the 
judge’s campaign, criminal defense attorneys contribute money in 
recognition of the judge’s record and its congruence with their own 
ideology.37 Thus, campaign contributions flow to judicial candidates 
because the ideological position of a contributor matches that of the 
judicial candidate. Therefore, under this view, donations are not 
meant to “buy a vote” or to create a quid-pro-quo relationship, but are 
designed to help elect ideologically similar candidates.38  
Both the quid-pro-quo and the ideological-matching views enjoy 
considerable support among commentators. Determining which view 
is more appropriate is beyond the scope of this Note because 
considerable portions of both the public and the bar believe that 
campaign donations create a quid-pro-quo relationship between 
contributors and judges.39 Even if empirically evidence attested that 
campaign contributions have no effect on the decisions made by 
elected judges, as the ideological-matching viewpoint arguably 
suggests, the public will still perceive the opposite. This is 
particularly troubling because the public provides legitimacy to the 
judiciary. 
The public’s negative perception of the judiciary, and not the 
relationship between contributions and judicial decision making, is 
the central problem that policymakers must confront. This is because 
“whether or not a judge is actually unduly influenced is unimportant 
since public perception of the courts as impartial is . . . essential to the 
effective operation of the judicial process.”40 A diminishment of 
judicial independence threatens the very legitimacy of state judicial 
systems, for, as Justice Anthony Kennedy stated: “[T]he law 
commands allegiance only if it commands respect. It commands 
                                                                                                                 
36 The example of a first-time judicial candidate can also demonstrate the ideological-
matching viewpoint. For instance, a criminal defense attorney could run for judge and, based on 
his practice area, receive the support of his fellow criminal defense attorneys.  
37 Indeed, ideological grassroots and business organizations demonstrate this dynamic. 
See Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR 
JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73, 
80–84 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (describing various organizations’ contributions to judicial 
campaigns geared toward advancing a particular issue).  
38 See id. (reviewing efforts of interest groups to elect ideologically-similar candidates).  
39 See infra Part I.C (discussing the public’s poor perception of the elected judiciary).  
40 DUBOIS, supra note 34, at 21–22; see also Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Thomas G. 
Hungar, Ethical Issues After Election, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE 
JUDGES 53, 73 (Roger Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996) (arguing that increased fundraising 
“has contributed to a perception of ‘justice for sale’ and has damaged public respect for the 
judiciary”); O’Connor, supra note 4, at i (“Whether or not [campaign contributions] actually tilt 
the scales of justice, three out of every four Americans believe that campaign contributions 
affect courtroom decisions.”). 
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respect only if the public thinks the judges are neutral.”41 Due to the 
threat campaign contributions pose to judicial legitimacy, 
policymakers must recognize the perceived lack of judicial 
independence and take action to correct it.42 As such, this Note 
proceeds based on the understanding that the public, and a sizable 
portion of the bar, views campaign contributions to judicial 
candidates as a form of manipulating judicial decisions and seeks to 
craft a solution that will improve that perception.  
B. Judicial Election Systems and Fundraising 
Thirty-eight states hold some form of judicial election.43 Twenty-
two of these states hold competitive elections for members of their 
highest court.44 States adopting this type of election feature 
campaigns in which all candidates battle for the seat and the one with 
the most votes wins.45 Additionally, sixteen states hold retention 
elections for members of their highest court.46 In retention elections, 
voters periodically decide whether sitting justices should serve 
another term by voting either “yes” or “no” on their retention.47  
Regardless of which type of election system is adopted, judges in 
these jurisdictions must raise money to ensure that they remain on the 
bench.48 Judicial candidates have responded to the need to raise 
money at an amazing rate, as Tables 1 and 2 indicate below. 49 Tables 
                                                                                                                 
41 Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 282 (citation omitted).  
42 See Jonathan Berman, You May Know the Law but I Own the Judge: Why Congress 
Can and Should Get Involved in State Judicial Election Reform, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 145, 150 
(2009) (suggesting a congressional solution); Boutrous & Hungar, supra note 40, at 76 (“Our 
judicial system can and should do better if public confidence in an elected judiciary is to be 
maintained.”); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 43 
(2003) (advocating both “short-term improvements in judicial elections” as well as “a longer but 
ultimately more promising course toward the gradual elimination of elected judiciaries”). 
43 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 99. 
44 Id.  
45 See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art VI, § 7 (providing that Minnesota judicial elections are to 
take place every six years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 200.015 (West 2009) (providing that 
Minnesota election law applies to all elections in the state).  
46 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 99.  
47 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 46.21 (2011) (providing a form to be used in judicial election 
ballots), id. § 602.4101 (providing that judicial officials must be appointed in accordance with 
chapter 46 of the Iowa Code).  
48 See Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 883 
(Ark. 2007) (noting that judicial candidates need to “raise the resources necessary to run their 
campaigns”); Penny J. White, ‘The Appeal’ to the Masses, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 251, 272 (2009) 
(“All contested judicial elections require incumbent judges to spend time raising money and 
campaigning during election years.”). Although all judicial candidates must raise money, those 
running in competitive elections are under particular pressure to do so. Boutrous & Hungar, 
supra note 40, at 72. 
49 Note that these tables do not include independent expenditures made in support of or in 
opposition to judicial candidates and that Table 2 does not include information for the 2010 
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1 and 2 also show the rapid growth of campaign fundraising by 
judicial candidates between the 1990s and the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. Such growth will likely continue to occur for 
two key reasons. First, it is extremely unlikely that states will move 
away from judicial elections in the near future, which means that the 
need for campaign funds will continue.50 Second, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,51 corporations and other interest groups will likely 
contribute even more money to their favored judicial candidates.52 
 
Table 1: Judicial Campaign Fundraising, 1990 Elections through 
1998 Elections53 
 
Election Cycle Total Funds Raised by All State 
Judicial Candidates 
1990 $5,935,367 
1992 $9,502,350 
1994 $20,728,646 
1996 $21,378,007 
1998 $27,357,316 
Total, 1990 through 1998 
Cycle 
$84,901,686 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
election cycle because data are not available from that cycle. An independent expenditure is an 
expenditure “for a communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the 
request or suggestion of a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a 
political party committee or its agents.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2010). Essentially, independent 
expenditures are those monies that outside groups spend for the purpose of either supporting or 
opposing a candidate.  
50 See infra Part III.A (detailing the difficulties encountered in attempting to abolish 
judicial elections). 
51 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
52 For discussions of Citizens United and its effect on judicial elections, see ADAM 
SKAGGS, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL ELECTION (2010) and 
Dorothy Samuels, Editorial, Hanging a “For Sale” Sign Over the Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 2010, at A22 (arguing that Citizens United will make the problem of money in judicial 
elections much worse).  
53 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.  
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Table 2: Judicial Campaign Fundraising, 2000 Elections through 
2008 Elections54 
 
Election Cycle Total Funds Raised by All State 
Judicial Candidates 
2000 $45,997,238 
2002 $29,738,006 
2004 $46,108,547 
2006 $33,238,379 
2008 $45,650,435 
Total, 2000 through 
2008 Cycle 
$200,732,605 
 
The figures in Tables 1 and 2 are daunting; particularly in light of 
how “low-key” judicial campaigns were prior to 1990.55 To better 
understand these numbers, it is necessary to know what types of 
actors provide money to judicial candidates. Table 3 illustrates that 
special interests are predominantly responsible for the funding of 
judicial campaigns and shows that business interests and lawyers are 
the most prominent contributors to judicial candidates.56 Note that, 
unlike Tables 1 and 2, Table 3’s totals include independent 
expenditures made in support of and in opposition to judicial 
candidates.57 Also note that all sources, including those not provided 
in Table 3, gave a total of $206,941,244 to judicial candidates through 
campaign contributions and independent expenditures. 58 
                                                                                                                 
54 Id. Note that there are fluctuations between cycles. Such fluctuation occurs because 
certain cycles involve more judicial elections than the other cycles. Compare 2011–2012 
Contestable Supreme Court Elections, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, 3 (last updated Feb. 22, 
2011), 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/20112012_Supreme_Court_Elections_Li_5A51906F8
029B.pdf (listing 23 state supreme court seats that are up for election in the 2012 cycle), with 
2009–2010 Contestable Supreme Court Elections, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, 3 (last 
updated Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/2010_Contestable_Supreme_Court_Elec_DEE38A695
5861.pdf (listing 36 state supreme court seats that are up for election in the 2010 cycle).  
55 See White, supra note 48, at 270 (describing three studies of judicial elections held 
prior to 2000 finding that one-third of judicial candidates raised no funds). 
56 See also Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 279 (“A large portion of donations to 
judicial campaigns is contributed by parties and lawyers with cases before the court.”); Boutrous 
& Hungar, supra note 40, at 73 (“Not surprisingly, the natural source for most of the campaign 
contributions in judicial elections is the local bar.”) (footnote omitted); White, supra note 48, at 
266–69 (discussing the increase in special interest groups’ contributions to judicial candidates).  
57 See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (“Much of the cash boom [in judicial election 
spending] in the last decade was fueled by a new class of super spenders . . . including business 
executives, unions and lawyers who are stakeholders in litigation . . . .”). 
58 Table 3 does not include the amount contributed by “other” groups, “unknown” 
sources, and “single issue” groups since they are not germane to this Note. Id. at 8. It is also 
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Table 3: Sources of Judicial Campaign Contributions, 2000 –200959 
 
Interest Type Amount Contributed 
Percentage of All 
Contributions 
Business Interests $62,589,165 30 
Lawyers/Lobbyists $59,272,198 29 
Political Parties $22,168,234 11 
Other Candidates $17,177,609 8 
Organized Labor $6,704,944 3 
Total Contributions 
Provided60 $167,912,150 81 
  
The amount contributed by business interests and lawyers, and the 
percentage that those amounts represent, speaks for itself. The clear 
inference is that business interests and other powerful groups are 
seeking to elect judges who will be amenable to their interests.61 As 
Richard Flamm observed in his judicial recusal treatise:  
[The election of state judges], as well as the fact that raising 
sufficient funds to wage a successful judicial election 
campaign is becoming increasingly more difficult, has 
inspired concerns regarding the nature of the election process, 
including concerns about the creation of a possible 
appearance of influence or corruption, and the appearance 
that such contributions may create opportunities for judges to 
curry favor with attorneys.62 
Furthermore, it is telling that judicial campaigns “are now high-
stakes contests in which chambers of commerce, tort reform 
lobbyists, organized labor, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and other much 
narrower interest groups spend substantial resources—frequently 
without disclosing the sources of their funding.”63 Because the parties 
who fund judicial campaigns are likely to appear before the court in 
                                                                                                                 
 
important to note that large donors are responsible for a vastly disproportionate share of 
contributions to judicial campaigns. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 279 (discussing 
the effect of attorney campaign contributions on judicial decisions). 
59 SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.  
60 This refers to the total contributions provided only by the sources listed in Table 3.  
61 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 42, at 147 (2009) (noting the increasing activity of 
business interests in judicial campaigns); White, supra note 48, at 268–69 (discussing the 
United States Chamber of Commerce’s efforts to influence judicial elections). 
62 FLAMM, supra note 26, § 9.4, at 240 (footnotes omitted).  
63 James Sample & David E. Pozen, Making Judicial Recusal More Rigorous, JUDGES’ J., 
Winter 2007, at 17, 18 (footnote omitted). 
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one capacity or another, it not difficult to understand why the public 
perceives the judiciary as lacking independence. 
C. The Perceived Lack of Judicial Independence 
Two extremely important segments of the population perceive 
elected state judges as lacking independence: the general public and 
the legal community, including judges. While there is a great deal of 
polling data available to demonstrate the public’s view of state court 
systems, a 1999 National Center for State Courts study64 and a 2001 
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and American Viewpoint survey 
are most illustrative.65 The 1999 survey shows that 38 percent 
“strongly agree” and 43 percent “somewhat agree” that “[j]udges’ 
decisions are influenced by political considerations.”66 It also 
indicates that 34 percent “strongly agree” and 44 percent “somewhat 
agree” that “[e]lected judges are influenced by having to raise 
campaign funds.”67  
The 2001 study has similar findings. According to this study, 55 
percent of respondents felt that the statement “[b]eholden to campaign 
donors” applied either “very well” or “well” to state judges, while 52 
percent felt the same about the statement “[c]ontrolled by special 
interests.”68 Furthermore, 56 percent said they were “concern[ed] . . . 
a lot” that “nearly half of all state supreme court69 cases involve 
someone who has given money to one or more of the justices hearing 
the case.”70 
                                                                                                                 
64 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS (1999). 
This survey asked 1,826 people about their views of state judicial systems. Id. at 9. 
65 Justice at Stake Frequency Questionnaire, GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH 
& AM. VIEWPOINT, (Nov. 7, 2001), 
http://www.greenbergresearch.com/articles/1617/1412_JAS_ntlsurvey.pdf. This survey asked 
1,000 respondents about their views of state judicial systems. Id. at 1. 
66 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 64, at 41. While the term “political 
considerations” encompasses more items than campaign contributions, it is difficult to see how 
respondents were not at least cognizant of campaign contributions when answering this 
question, especially in light of other questions about campaign fundraising and its effect on 
judges. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.  
67 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 64, at 42. Similarly, a 2004 Zogby Poll of 
1,204 adult Americans found that 71 percent believed that campaign contributions to elected 
judges has “at least some influence on judges’ decisions in the courtroom.” JUSTICE AT STAKE 
CAMPAIGN, MARCH 2004 SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS: AMERICANS SPEAK OUT ON JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS (2004). 
68 GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM. VIEWPOINT, supra note 65, at 5. 
69 The poll only asked questions referring to state supreme courts, not the United States 
Supreme Court. See id. at 3.  
70 Id. at 8. 81 percent said that they were either “a lot” or “a little” concerned with this 
prospect. Id. Only 5 percent said that campaign contributions have no effect at all on judicial 
decisions. Id. at 4.  
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Statewide polls have shown similar results. In Texas, 83 percent of 
adults indicate that they believe campaign contributions “very 
significantly” or “fairly significantly” affect judges’ decisions.71 In 
Pennsylvania, around 90 percent of adults say that large contributions 
influence judicial decisions.72 And, in Ohio, 58 percent believe 
contributions affect judges’ rulings.73 North Dakota74 and Louisiana 
exhibit the same dynamics.75  
The most troubling aspect of this sentiment is the effect it has on 
the public’s perception of equality in the judicial system. In the 
Greenberg Rosner Research and American Viewpoint survey, only 33 
percent say that the American judiciary “works equally for all 
citizens” while 62 percent believe that “[t]here are two systems of 
justice in the United States—one for the rich and powerful and one 
for everyone else.”76 Although there are likely a variety of reasons 
why most Americans feel this way, a clear connection exists between 
these responses and the survey’s findings regarding the public’s 
negative perception that judges treat litigants who are and are not 
campaign donors differently. The survey shows that 67 percent of 
respondents indicated that the statement “[i]ndividuals and groups 
who give money to judicial candidates often get favorable treatment” 
is either “much” or “somewhat” closer to their view than the 
statement that “individuals and groups who give money to judicial 
candidates are treated the same as everyone else.”77  
Perhaps more disconcerting than the public’s recognition of 
campaign contributions’ hold on judicial decisions are judges’ and 
other legal professionals’ recognition of the same force. A 2002 
survey of close to 2,500 judges indicated that 22 percent believed that 
campaign contributions have “some influence” on judicial decisions 
and that 46 percent believed that contributions have at least “a little 
influence.” This feeling undoubtedly led 56 percent of the judges 
surveyed to indicate that they somewhat supported the statement that 
                                                                                                                 
71 Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1470–71 (2001). 
72 Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 283. 
73 Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing a poll of Ohio voters 
regarding their beliefs on campaign contributions to judicial candidates conducted by a 
judicially appointed Special Committee and the poll’s findings). 
74 See Dale Wetzel, N.D. Residents Support Courts, But with Reservations, BISMARCK 
TRIB., Nov. 7, 1999, at 6C (reporting that many citizens of North Dakota believe that “judges’ 
decisions are influenced by politics and campaign contributions”). 
75 See Michelle Millhollon, Poll: Funds Can Sway Louisiana Judges, BATON ROUGE 
ADVOC., Jan. 10, 2000, at 1A. 
76 GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM.VIEWPOINT, supra note 65, at 7. 
77 Id. at 7. Only 23 percent answered that the statement “[i]ndividuals and groups who 
give money to judicial candidates are treated the same as everyone else” was closer to their 
opinion. Id.  
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“[j]udges should be prohibited from presiding over and ruling in cases 
when one of the parties has given money to their campaign.”78 
Furthermore, in Texas, 79 percent of attorneys, 69 percent of court 
personnel, and, most notably, 48 percent of judges believe that 
campaign contributions affect judges’ decisions.79 In light of both the 
public’s and the legal profession’s recognition of the potential bias 
inherent in cases involving campaign contributors, it is difficult to 
suggest that no action is necessary to correct the negative perception 
of judicial independence.  
II. JUDICIAL RECUSAL IN THE SUPREME COURT AND AMONG THE 
STATES 
The Supreme Court and the states have sought to protect judicial 
independence by promulgating various recusal rules. The current 
legal framework for handling recusal motions in cases involving 
campaign contributors arises from three key sources: (1) case law, (2) 
state judicial ethics provisions, and (3) state statutory codes.80  
A. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Recusal 
Caperton, and precedents cited therein, has had central importance 
in recent developments surrounding judicial recusal,81 making it 
critical in discussing the Court’s current analytical framework for 
recusal issues. Throughout the Court’s recusal jurisprudence, it has 
recognized the following foundational principle: due process demands 
recusal where “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge 
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”82  
1. Pre-Caperton Standards 
Before Caperton, the Court formulated its recusal jurisprudence 
around two primary maxims. First, it drew from The Federalist’s 
statement that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; 
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not 
improbably, corrupt his integrity.”83 Second, it has declared that 
                                                                                                                 
78 GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RESEARCH & AM.VIEWPOINT, supra note 65, at 11.  
79 Geyh, supra note 71, at 1470–71 (footnote omitted).  
80 FLAMM, supra note 26, § 2.6, at 39 (“[T]he right to disqualify a judge is more 
commonly found in a jurisdiction’s statutory law than in its constitution.”). 
81 See generally James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. 
REV. 787 (2010) (discussing Caperton’s impact on state recusal rules and public financing for 
judicial elections).  
82 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).  
83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The 
Caperton Court approvingly noted that the Court’s jurisprudence reflects this language. 
 1/5/2012 2:31:07 PM 
2011] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 191 
judicial recusal is required to ensure the availability of “[a] fair trial in 
a fair tribunal.”84  
According to the Caperton Court, there are two prominent 
contexts that raise recusal concerns. The first context involves local 
tribunals that heard cases involving violations of local ordinances.85 
The common characteristic of these tribunals is that the arbiters often 
had financial interest in the outcome of the cases they heard, which 
resulted in the Court striking down the tribunals’ existence.86 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the local tribunal cases indicated the Court 
was concerned not just with pecuniary interest when deciding the 
proper scope of recusal, but also “with a more general concept of 
interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”87 He also 
found from this precedent that the Court noted the importance of 
using an objective standard when hearing recusal cases.88  
The second context that the Caperton Court cited involves 
criminal contempt proceedings.89 Justice Kennedy referred to this 
context as illuminative in Caperton because, like the local tribunal 
cases, it shows the importance of utilizing an objective test. The 
objective test created in the criminal contempt cases was formulated 
as an assessment of “whether the average judge in his position is 
‘likely’ to be neutral or whether there is unconstitutional ‘potential for 
bias.’”90 
These pre-Caperton cases provide some guidance for courts and 
state legislatures in handling judicial recusal. As Justice Kennedy 
noted, these cases establish that the recusal standard should be 
                                                                                                                 
 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009).  
84 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).  
85 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259–60.  
86 See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972) (invalidating a 
mayor’s court that heard cases involving local ordinance violations because case outcomes 
provided additional revenue to the city budget); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) 
(invalidating a mayor’s court that heard cases involving alcohol ordinance violations because 
the mayor received direct financial benefit from convictions); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 
564, 579 (1973) (invalidating an administrative boards composed of optometrists that settled 
disputes among other optometrists because the board’s decisions benefited the practices of its 
members). 
87 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260. 
88 Id. at 2261.  
89 Id. In discussing criminal contempt contexts, the Caperton Court cited Mayberry v. 
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), and In re Murchison. 
90 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262. The Caperton Court’s view that an objective test is 
appropriate for recusal situations is consistent with the general view among the nation’s courts. 
See FLAMM, supra note 26, § 2.8.2, at 47 (“[I]t has generally been considered that any conduct 
that would lead a reasonable person, knowing all of the relevant facts and circumstances, to 
conclude that a judge’s impartiality might reasonably questioned, provides a proper basis for 
seeking judicial disqualification.”) (footnote omitted).  
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objective and not based on whether the judge in question had a 
subjective bias towards or against one party.91 However, these 
precedents and the standards they create are deficient. First, the 
precedents are not directly on point since they do not involve judicial 
recusal in the context of campaign contributions. Second, the 
standards are not particularly explicit because they simply refer to 
reasonableness, which is open to many different interpretations. 
2. The Caperton Standard 
Caperton went beyond the Court’s recusal precedents discussed 
above and provides particularly significant guidance to this Note’s 
topic.  
a) Facts of the Case 
Caperton involves complex and unique facts. The case 
commenced in August 2002 when a West Virginia jury found A.T. 
Massey Coal Company and its affiliates liable for fraudulent 
misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious contractual 
interference.92 As a result, Hugh Caperton, the owner of another 
mining operation, was awarded $50 million in both compensatory and 
punitive damages. Massey moved twice for post-judgment relief, but 
was denied on both occasions.93  
As the post-judgment stage proceeded, Don Blankenship, 
Massey’s chief executive officer, president, and chairman, became 
convinced that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would 
hear the case. Blankenship then targeted Justice Warren McGraw for 
defeat in the 2004 Election and supported McGraw’s opponent, Brent 
Benjamin. Blankenship’s support for Benjamin primarily took the 
form of extensive financial contributions. These contributions 
included the following: 
(1) A personal contribution of $1,000 to Benjamin’s 
campaign committee, which was the maximum allowed by 
law; 
(2) A $2.5 million contribution to “And For The Sake Of The 
Kids,” a political organization that supported Benjamin’s 
campaign; and 
                                                                                                                 
91 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260–63. 
92 Id. at 2257. 
93 Id.  
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(3) $500,000 in independent expenditures to support 
Benjamin’s campaign.94 
Justice Kennedy put these contributions in perspective by stating: 
“Blankenship’s $3 million in contributions were more than the total 
amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the 
amount spent by Benjamin’s own committee.”95 Blankenship’s 
contributions ultimately proved beneficial, as Benjamin defeated 
McGraw by almost 50,000 votes out of about 715,000 votes cast.96 
After Benjamin won and before the case was placed on the West 
Virginia Supreme Court’s docket, Caperton moved that Benjamin 
recuse himself.97 Benjamin predictably declined because “he found no 
objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias for or 
against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters which 
comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair 
and impartial.”98 Following this first recusal motion, the court 
reversed the verdict against Massey by a vote of 3-2, with Justice 
Benjamin in the majority. On rehearing, both Caperton and Massey 
moved to disqualify three of the justices. Two of them, one in the 
majority and one in the minority, did recuse themselves, but Justice 
Benjamin again refrained from doing so. In recusing himself, Justice 
Larry Starcher, who was originally in the minority, starkly described 
“Blankenship’s bestowal of his personal wealth, political tactics, and 
‘friendship’” as a “cancer in the affairs of this Court.”99 With 
Benjamin in the three-person majority, the West Virginia Supreme 
Court again decided to vacate the judgment against Massey, which 
precipitated Caperton’s appeal to the United States Supreme Court.100 
b) A New Objective Standard 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the West Virginia 
Supreme Court and found that Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse 
                                                                                                                 
94 Id. 
95 Id. Blankenship’s contribution to And For The Sake Of The Kids amounted to about 
two-thirds of the organization’s fundraising. Id.  
96 STATE OF W. VA., ORIGINAL CERTIFICATION OF NOVEMBER 2, 2004 GENERAL 
ELECTION (2005), available at 
http://www.sos.wv.gov/elections/historyresource/Documents/allgeneral04.pdf.  
97 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257–58. 
98 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258 (internal citations omitted). In the last decade, legislators 
in four states have considered new laws to prevent judges from hearing motions that ask for 
their own recusal. William E. Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court from Itself”?: 
Recusal, Separation of Powers, and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 772–73 
(2010).  
99 Id.(citations omitted). 
100 Id. at 2259. Note that two judges were designated to sit by Justice Benjamin after 
Justices Larry Starcher and Eliot Maynard recused themselves. Id. at 2258. 
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himself violated of the Due Process Clause.101 The Court specifically 
noted that “there is a serious risk of actual bias . . . when a person 
with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising 
funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was 
pending or imminent.”102 Drawing from the precedents discussed 
above, the majority held that “[d]ue process requires an objective 
inquiry into whether the contributor’s influence on the election under 
all the circumstances ‘would offer a possible temptation to the 
average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, 
and true.’”103 In the context of judicial recusal and campaign 
contributions, the Court determined that this inquiry should consider 
the size of the contribution, the total amount spent in the course of the 
campaign, the “apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome 
of the election,” and “[t]he temporal relationship” between the 
contribution, election, and the imminence of the case’s decision.104  
Indeed, Caperton’s result represented a positive step toward 
reclaiming judicial independence in the modern age of runaway 
campaign spending.105 Still, the standard that the Court articulated in 
Caperton has serious deficiencies. Justice Kennedy immediately 
undercut the decision’s effectiveness in advancing the cause of 
judicial independence. He labeled the case as “exceptional”106 and 
involving “extreme” facts,107 which suggests that the case has limited 
precedential value.108 So, while Caperton is a positive development in 
the protection of judicial independence, it is not the final solution 
needed to adequately protect judicial independence, especially in light 
of the questions raised in Chief Justice John Roberts’ dissent.  
                                                                                                                 
101 Id. at 2256, 2266–67. 
102 Id. at 2263–64.  
103 Id. at 2264 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).  
104 Id. at 2264.  
105 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?: Giving Adequate Attention to 
Failings of Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“The Court’s [decision in 
Caperton] was a huge step forward in promoting sounder judicial ethics, particularly so in the 
recent era of big money in state judicial elections.”).  
106 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. 
107 Id. at 2265. 
108 See Stephen M. Hoersting & Bradley A. Smith, The Caperton Caper and the Kennedy 
Conundrum, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 319, 344 (“[The] Caperton opinion struggles to define 
the case as an outlier that should have no broad precedential value.”). For an argument that 
Caperton is limited only to its facts, see James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, Extreme 
Facts, Extraordinary Case: The Sui Generis Recusal Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 305, 327 (2010).  
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c) Chief Justice Roberts’ Dissent 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion drew a strong dissent from Chief 
Justice Roberts that Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined.109 The 
dissenters seized on Kennedy’s two references to “probability of bias” 
as representing the majority’s short-hand for the new standard on 
judicial recusal110 and criticized such a standard as having unlimited 
application111 and “fail[ing] to provide clear, workable guidance for 
future cases.”112 In presenting this criticism, Chief Justice Roberts 
enumerated forty questions that the majority’s standard left 
unresolved.113 While each of these questions “are serious and require 
reflection,”114 only those that are the most applicable to this Note’s 
topic are described below. 
Based on a review of Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent, the most 
applicable questions fall into three categories: (1) “contribution 
questions”; (2) “contributor questions”; and (3) “judge questions.” 
“Contribution questions” are those regarding what amount and what 
type of campaign contributions trigger the application of the Caperton 
standard. For example, Chief Justice Roberts asked, “What level of 
contribution or expenditure gives rise to a ‘probability of bias?’”115 
Another key concern that Chief Justice Roberts raised in this category 
of questions is whether the litigant’s independent expenditures or 
contributions to independent groups involved in judicial elections also 
implicate the Caperton standard.116 He also inquired whether non-
financial support for judicial candidates, such as “endorsements by 
newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or celebrities” gives rise to 
Caperton concerns.117 
The “contributor questions” focus on the characteristics of a donor, 
whether an individual or an interest group, and its effect on the 
                                                                                                                 
109 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 2263 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy did not explicitly refer to the standard 
developed in the majority opinion as requiring “probability of bias,” but that did not prevent 
Chief Justice Roberts from referencing various formulations of the term seventeen times in his 
dissent. Id. at 2267–71, 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
111 Id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] ‘probability of bias’ cannot be defined in 
any limited way.”). 
112 Id. at 2269. 
113 For all forty questions, see id. at 2269–72. 
114 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing Forty Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts’s 
Concerns in Caperton and Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal 
and Due Process, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009).  
115 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
116 See id. at 2269 (“Are independent, non-coordinated expenditures treated the same as 
direct contributions to a candidate’s campaign? What about contributions to independent outside 
groups supporting a candidate?”).  
117 Id. at 2270. 
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application of the Caperton standard. For instance, Chief Justice 
Roberts inquired, “What if the ‘disproportionately’ large expenditure 
is made by an industry association, trade union, physicians’ group, or 
the plaintiffs’ bar? Must the judge recuse in all cases that affect the 
association’s interest?”118 He also asked whether the Caperton 
standard applied to cases in which the judge’s campaign supporter is 
not a party to the pending litigation but is affected by the pending 
litigation, as well as whether the standard applied to cases in which 
the litigant’s attorney provided the donation.119 
Questions in the third category, the “judge questions,” focus on 
what types of judges are potentially affected by the Caperton 
standard. Chief Justice Roberts’ questions include “[d]oes it matter 
whether the judge plans to run for reelection?”120 and “[w]hat if the 
election is nonpartisan?”121 In this category of questions, Chief 
Justice Roberts also focused on the fact that Justice Benjamin was not 
alone in ruling in favor of Massey.122 In connection with this, he 
asked, “Must the judge’s vote be outcome determinative in order for 
his non-recusal to constitute a due process violation?”123 
Some commentators defend Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent by 
labeling the result reached by the majority as a “mistake.”124 Others 
have called it nit-picking125 and argue that “Chief Justice Roberts 
appears to have become lost in his thicket of point-picking questions 
and abandoned perspective, embracing the tree so closely that his 
view of the forest was lost.”126  
Regardless of which view one accepts, one must recognize that 
Chief Justice Roberts raises important questions that lawmakers and 
judges must address.127 Indeed, many of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
questions remain unresolved in recusal provisions found in the states’ 
                                                                                                                 
118 Id. at 2269. Chief Justice Roberts also asked, “What if the case involves a social or 
ideological issue rather than a financial one? Must a judge recuse himself from cases involving, 
say, abortion rights if he has received ‘disproportionate’ support from individuals who feel 
strongly about either side of that issue?” Id.  
119 Id. at 2270.  
120 Id. at 2269. 
121 Id. at 2271. 
122 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258 (majority opinion).  
123 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2270 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
124 Lawrence Lessig, What Everyone Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 104, 112 (2009). Lessig further stated that “[t]he Supreme Court was wrong to expand the 
reach of due process to remedy [Judge Benjamin’s] bad judgment . . . .” Id.  
125 See Stempel, supra note 105, 1–3 (drawing an analogy between Chief Justice Roberts’s 
forty questions and high school debating strategy).  
126 Id. at 66. 
127 Even critics of Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent concede that he raises important 
questions. See, e.g., id. at 8 (conceding that the forty questions found in Chief Justice Roberts’s 
dissent are “serious and require reflection”).  
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statutory and judicial ethics codes. As such, a recusal-based solution 
should resolve the Chief Justice’s questions.  
B. The States’ Treatment of Judicial Recusal 
The Supreme Court has noted that “most matters relating to 
judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.”128 This 
recognition indicates that the Court typically views judicial recusal as 
a matter that falls within the province of state discretion.129 As such, it 
is important to acquire a flavor for what the states’ recusal rules 
normally require. Generally, states have promulgated statutes and 
ethics provisions that create starkly different standards for judicial 
recusal.130 Among the thirty-nine states that hold judicial elections, 
there are three primary approaches to judicial recusal in cases 
involving campaign contributors: (1) passing statutes and ethics code 
provisions that lack any explicit reference to campaign contributions 
as potentially disqualifying factors, (2) passing ethics code 
provisions, but not statutes, that explicitly refer to a certain level of 
contribution by a litigant or attorney as a disqualifying factor, and (3) 
passing statutes with explicit reference to campaign contributions as 
grounds for recusal.  
1. States with Recusal Statutes and Ethics Provisions Lacking 
Reference to Campaign Contributions 
The overwhelming majority of states holding judicial elections fall 
into the first category: states with recusal statutes and ethics 
provisions that lack specific reference to campaign contributions.131 
                                                                                                                 
128 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948).  
129 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (stating that “matters of kinship, personal 
bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of 
legislative discretion”).  
130 See FLAMM, supra note 26, § 28.1, at 824 (“[P]recisely what a party needs to show in 
order to carry its burden on disqualification varies considerably from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.”).  
131 See MD. CONST. art. IV, part I § 7; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 18; TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 
11; TEX. CONST. art V, § 11; ALASKA STAT. § 222.20.020 (LexisNexis 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§§ 16–11–108, 16–13–214, 16–15–111 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13–1–122 (2010); FLA. 
STAT. § 38.01 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 15–1–8 (2008); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 114–5 (2010) 
(recusal for criminal cases); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 2–1001 (2011) (recusal for civil cases); 
IND. CODE § 34–35–1–1 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20–311d (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 26A.015 (West 2006); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 151(A) (1999 & Supp. 2011); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 542.16 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 508.100 (West 2009); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 3–1–803 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24–739 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 1.230 (West 2009); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 14 (McKenney 2002 & Supp 2011); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A–1223 (2009) (only applicable in criminal cases); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29–15–
21 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.031 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1401 (2002 
& Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 14.210 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A–21–1 (2004); 
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New Mexico, for example, uses representative language regarding the 
grounds for recusal: “No justice, judge, or magistrate of any court 
shall . . . sit in any cause in which either of the parties are related to 
him . . . , or in the trial of which he presided in any inferior court, or 
in which he has an interest.”132 This type of language provides three 
bases for a judge’s recusal: (1) a familial relationship to a party, (2) 
previous involvement with a case in an inferior court, and (3) the 
existence of an interest. The first two bases are relatively 
straightforward, but the last one presents less certainty.133 
When determining what amounts to a recusal-worthy “interest,” 
most courts in these states have rejected the contention that the mere 
receipt of campaign contributions renders a judge subject to 
recusal.134 The clearest expression of this general trend comes from 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which has stated that “[t]here is no 
case law in Wisconsin or elsewhere that requires recusal of a judge or 
justice based solely on a contribution to a judicial campaign.”135  
                                                                                                                 
 
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.12.030 (2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51–2–8 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 757.19 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5–9–119 (West 2011). For a discussion of the 
various standards established among the states in this group, see Raftery, supra note 98, at 769–
72. A review of the states’ statutory codes on the judiciary reveals that Idaho, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania lack any general statute outlining the grounds for recusal.  
132 N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 18. The United States Congress has passed a statute that creates 
a very similar standard for judicial recusal as the states in this group. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 
(2006) (allowing a judge to recuse himself or herself where the judge’s objectivity “might 
reasonably be questioned”).  
133 See, e.g., State ex rel. Anaya v. Scarborough, 410 P.2d 732, 733–34 (N.M. 1966) 
(noting the difficulties of interpreting the meaning of “interest” in N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 18).  
134 See, e.g., Keane v. Andrews, 555 So. 2d 940, 940 (Fla. App. 1990) (per curiam) 
(holding “that a contribution not exceeding the legal limit for campaign contributions made by 
counsel to the campaign of a trial judge before whom counsel then appears is a legally 
insufficient ground to justify recusal . . . ”); Peterson v. Borst, 784 N.E.2d 934, 937 (Ind. 2003) 
(noting that states with judicial elections do not consider receipt of campaign contributions from 
a party in the case as grounds for recusal); Williams v. Viswanathan, 65 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the receipt of campaign contributions is not enough to 
require judicial recusal); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Eighth 
Judicial District Court, 5 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Nev. 2000) (per curiam) (commenting that the 
Nevada Judicial Ethics Code did not require a judge to recuse himself or herself if the judge 
received campaign contributions from one of the parties in a case); Collier v. Griffith, No. 01–
A–019109CV00339, 1992 WL 44893, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 1992) (commenting that 
neither Tennessee’s Code of Professional Responsibility nor its Code of Judicial Conduct 
prohibit judges from accepting campaign contributions from attorneys or from presiding over 
cases litigated by attorneys from whom they have received contributions); cf. Reems v. St. 
Joseph’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 536 N.W.2d 666, 668, 671 (N.D. 1995) (holding that judges 
decision to preside over case when one of the party’s attorneys served as his campaign chair did 
not violate the state’s judicial ethics code); In re Disqualification of Ney, 657 N.E.2d 1367, 
1368 (Ohio 1995) (holding that the fact that one of the attorneys of record in a pending case 
practices law with the chairman of the judge's campaign committee is not, without more, 
grounds for disqualification). 
135 Storms v. Action Wis., Inc., 754 N.W.2d 480, 487 (Wis. 2008) (quoting letter from 
James S. Alexander, Exec. Dir., Wis. Judicial Comm’n, to Julaine K. Appling, President, Wis. 
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Moreover, ethics codes in these states also suggest that it is 
permissible for judges to hear cases involving their campaign 
contributors. As the Wisconsin Judicial Conduct Advisory Committee 
has opined:  
[T]he mere fact of prior support for, or opposition to, a 
judge’s election does not necessarily rise to the level of an 
appearance of impropriety. Both the public, and 
knowledgeable persons within the judicial system, are fully 
aware of, and likely comfortable with, the fact that people 
will support an individual for judicial office with various 
levels of assistance, monetary support, or endorsements. This 
fact, in and of itself, does not create so close or special a 
relationship to require automatic recusal.136   
Most states that lack statutes with explicit reference to campaign 
contributions as grounds for recusal also lack ethics code provisions 
that require recusal when campaign contributors appear before a 
judge. Louisiana’s judicial ethics code serves as a representative 
example. It requires that a judge “disqualify himself or herself in a 
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned . . . In all other instances, a judge should not recuse 
himself or herself.”137 
In 2006, the Louisiana Court of Appeal applied this ethics code to 
judicial recusal in Whalen v. Murphy.138 In Whalen, a trial court judge 
                                                                                                                 
 
Family Action, Inc. (Apr. 28, 2008)).  
136 See, e.g., Wis. Jud. Conduct Advisory Comm., Op. 03–1, 4 (2004).  
137 LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2010). The other states in this category 
similarly lack reference to campaign contributions in the recusal provisions of their judicial 
ethics codes. See ALASKA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1998); ARK. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2009); COLO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2010); FLA. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2010); GA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2009); IDAHO CODE 
OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2010); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63, Canon 3(C) (2009); IND. CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2010); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 601B, CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2009); 
KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 3(C)(3) (2010); MD. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2010); 
MICH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2008); MINN. CT. RULES, Canon 2, Prof’l R. 2.11 
(2011); MO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R 2.03, Canon 3(E) (2007); MONT. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.12 (2008); NEB. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT § 5–203, Canon 3(E) (2010); 
REVISED NEV. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2010); N.M. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 
21–400 (2010); N.Y. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2010); N.C. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2008); OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); OKLA. CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); REVISED OR. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT JR 2–106 (2011); PA. 
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2007); S.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2009); 
TENN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 10, Canon (E) (2007); TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2010) 
(containing no reference to any grounds for disqualification); W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 
Canon 3(E) (1993); WIS. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 60.04(4) (2002); WYO. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011).  
138 943 So. 2d 504 (La. Ct. App. 2006).  
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vacated a summary judgment order against the plaintiff after the 
attorney for the plaintiff contributed to the judge’s campaign 
committee.139 The defendant moved for recusal, which the trial court 
denied and the Court of Appeal affirmed.140 The Court of Appeal 
reasoned that “[a]lthough the record establishe[d] that Judge Kelly 
vacated the previously-granted summary judgment in favor of [the 
defendant] after receiving a campaign contribution from [the 
plaintiff’s attorney], the evidence simply [did] not establish actual 
bias.”141 Whalen’s result suggests that judicial ethics provisions 
without explicit reference to campaign contributions as disqualifying 
factors are as unlikely as similarly silent statutes to compel recusal in 
cases involving judges’ campaign contributors. 
The responses in Wisconsin and Louisiana, as well as the other 
states in this category, appear tone-deaf. The deficiency of these 
responses becomes increasingly apparent when one considers studies 
showing the connection between campaign contributions and elected 
judges’ positions in cases involving their contributors142 and the 
public’s lack of confidence in the judiciary.143 States can and should 
do better than merely sweeping the involvement of campaign 
contributors in a pending case under the rug.  
                                                                                                                 
139 Id. at 505–06. 
140 Id. at 506, 509.  
141 Id. at 509. 
142 Shepherd, supra note 8, at 652–65 (using empirical data to support the assertion that 
judges decide cases in line with the dominant political philosophy held by voters); Liptak & 
Roberts, supra note 1 (describing cases in which judges voted in support of campaign 
contributors).  
143 For a discussion of the public’s lack of confidence in the judiciary, see supra Part I.C.  
 1/5/2012 2:31:07 PM 
2011] JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 201 
2. States with Judicial Ethics Provisions Enumerating Campaign 
Contributions as Grounds for Recusal144 
While the norm is for states not to consider campaign 
contributions as dispositive for recusal purposes, “in some 
jurisdictions, the fact that contributions have been made to a judge, 
either by attorneys or by others, may be considered to be relevant to 
the question of [recusal].”145 Five states—Arizona, Iowa, Mississippi, 
Utah, and Washington—have made campaign contributions 
“relevant” by passing judicial ethics provisions that enumerate 
campaign contributions by an attorney of record or litigant as grounds 
for judicial recusal.146 Both Arizona’s and Utah’s provisions are 
based on the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which sets explicit contribution limits that give rise to 
recusal motions.147 Meanwhile, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, 
Michigan, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma and Washington 
developed their own language independent of the Model Code.148  
In regard to campaign contributions as grounds for judicial recusal, 
the Model Code provides that: 
                                                                                                                 
144 Four states have taken some action to make campaign contributions possible grounds 
for recusal, but those actions are either not to the level of statutory or ethics codification or they 
do not explicitly enumerate campaign contributions. New York has not passed a judicial ethics 
provision in this area, but the state’s top court officials recently handed down a policy that bars 
“elected judges from hearing cases involving lawyers and others” who contributed $2,500 or 
more to the judge’s campaign in the two years before the case’s initiation. William Glaberson, 
State Is Cutting Judges’ Ties to Lawyers Who Are Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at A1. 
Furthermore, Missouri has not enacting a judicial ethics provision enumerating campaign 
contributions as grounds for recusal, but it has added commentary to that effect. See MO. CODE 
OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2, Canon 5(B) cmt. (2010) (“A candidate for judicial office should 
consider whether his or her conduct may create grounds for recusal for actual bias or a 
probability of bias pursuant to [Caperton].”). Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court has 
changed the state’s civil procedure rules to imply that campaign contributions are possible 
grounds for recusal. See MICH. R. CIV. P. 2.003(C)(1)(b) (2011) (“Disqualification of a judge is 
warranted . . . [if t]he judge, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, has . . . a serious 
risk of actual bias impacting the due process rights of a party as enunciated in [Caperton] . . . 
.”). Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has enacted a judicial ethics provision that 
enumerates campaign contributions as grounds for recusal. See OKLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT 
R. 2.11(A)(4) (2011) (requiring disqualification if “[t]he judge knows or learns by means of a 
timely motion that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the 
previous four (4) years made aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that 
a reasonable person would believe could affect the fairness of the judge’s consideration of a 
case involving the party, the party’s lawyer or the law firm of the party’s lawyer”).  
145 FLAMM, supra note 26, § 9.4, at 246. 
146 None of the five states has passed a statute enumerating campaign contributions as 
possible grounds for recusal. See ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 12–409 (2002); IOWA CODE. § 602.1606 
(2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9–1–11 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A–2–222 (West 2011); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.12.030 (2010).  
147 Judicial Disqualification Based on Commitments and Campaign Contributions, AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, 2–3 (last updated Sept. 23, 2011).  
148 Id. at 6–11.  
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A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding 
in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including but not limited to the following 
circumstances: . . . 
(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely 
motion that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm 
of a party’s lawyer has within the previous [insert 
number] year[s] made aggregated contributions to the 
judge’s campaign in an amount that is greater than 
[$[insert amount] for an individual or $[insert 
amount] for an entity] [is reasonable and appropriate 
for an individual or an entity].149 
This provision is non-discretionary and requires judges to recuse 
themselves whenever the contribution amount provided by a litigant 
or attorney is greater than the level set.150 Arizona modified the model 
language to set the applicable time period for the aggregate 
contributions at four years; it also set the contribution level requiring 
recusal at the maximum campaign contribution allowed for all 
statewide and non-statewide elections.151 Conversely, Utah 
established the much lower threshold of fifty dollars within the 
previous three years.152  
The Model Rule and its enactment in Arizona and Utah are 
positive developments in ensuring that judges hear fewer cases 
involving their campaign contributors. Still, this step does not address 
the influence of independent expenditures. Furthermore, it does not 
provide guidance to a judge who hears cases that involve special 
interest groups that previously supported the judge as a candidate. 
These are glaring deficiencies in light of the rise in independent 
                                                                                                                 
149 MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2011).  
150 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 147, at 4. 
151 ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 211(A)(4) (2009) (requiring recusal where “[t]he 
judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm 
of a party’s lawyer has within the previous four years made aggregate contributions to the 
judge’s campaign in the amount that is greater than the amounts permitted pursuant to [statute 
setting maximum contribution limits].”) (emphasis added). Arizona law sets the following 
contribution limits: $390 for non-statewide, non-legislative campaigns and $1,010 for statewide, 
non-legislative campaigns. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16–905(A)(2) (2006) (setting the $390 
limit); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16–905(B)(1)–(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (setting the $1,010 
limit). 
152 See UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2011) (requiring recusal where “[t]he 
judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm 
of a party’s lawyer has within the previous three years made aggregate contributions to the 
judge’s retention in an amount that is greater than $50”) (emphasis added).  
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expenditures and judicial campaign contributions by interest 
groups.153 
Mississippi similarly enumerates campaign contributions by a 
litigant or an attorney of record as possible grounds for recusal. The 
Mississippi provision, however, has significant differences from the 
model rule: it neither explicitly sets a contribution limit nor requires 
judges to recuse themselves once the contributions received reach a 
certain limit.154 Instead, the Mississippi rule states that “[a] party may 
file a motion to recuse a judge based on the fact that an opposing 
party or counsel of record for the party is a major donor to the 
election campaign of such judge.”155 Likewise, the rules in Iowa and 
Washington fail to specify explicit contribution limits by essentially 
codifying the Caperton standard.156  
These rules are better than ethics provisions and statutes lacking 
any reference to campaign contributions as grounds for recusal; they 
are not, however, a panacea for the appearance of impropriety that 
occurs when judges hear cases involving their campaign contributors. 
Two problems exist with the Mississippi rule. First, the term “major 
donor” opens the rule to uncertainty and its inclusion in the rule 
allows judges to continue to hear cases in which their campaign 
contributors are parties.157 Second, the commentary to the rule 
undercuts its effectiveness and reach by recognizing that, “political 
                                                                                                                 
153 See supra Part I.B.  
154 See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 147, at 3–4 (labeling “[s]tatements that . . . 
Mississippi [has] adopted a rule similar to the model code provision [as] not accurate” and 
stating that the Mississippi provision “falls far short of the ABA model rule requiring a judge to 
disqualify”).  
155 MISS. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(2) (2002).  
156 See IOWA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 51:2.11(A)(4) (2010) (“The judge knows or 
learns by means of disclosure mandated by law or a timely motion that the judge’s participation 
in a matter or proceeding would violate due process of law as a result of: (a) campaign 
contributions made by donors associated or affiliated with a party or counsel appearing before 
the court; or (b) independent campaign expenditures by a person other than a judge’s campaign 
committee, whose donors to the independent campaign are associated or affiliated with a party 
or counsel appearing before the court.”); WASH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(D) (2011) (“A 
judge may disqualify himself or herself if the judge learns by means of a timely motion by a 
party that an adverse party has provided financial support for any of the judge’s judicial election 
campaigns within the last six years in an amount that causes the judge to conclude that his or her 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In making this determination the judge should 
consider: (1) the total amount of financial support provided by the party relative to the total 
amount of the financial support for the judge’s election, (2) the timing between the financial 
support and the pendency of the matter, and (3) any additional circumstances pertaining to 
disqualification.”); see also AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 147, at 8, 11 (describing the 
Iowa and Washington statutes). 
157 For instance, the inclusion of this language in the judicial ethics code did not prevent a 
Mississippi appellate court from holding that a $500 campaign contribution to a probate judge 
by a party with a pending case before the judge was insufficient to establish grounds for recusal. 
In re Estate of Woodfield, 968 So. 2d 475, 488 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 
968 So. 2d 421, 430 (Miss. 2007).  
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donations may but do not necessarily raise concerns about a judge’s 
impartiality.”158 In regard to the Iowa and Washington rules, since 
they codify the ambiguous Caperton standard, those rules are just as 
muddled.159 Thus, while the Iowa, Mississippi, and Washington rules 
are well-intentioned attempts to rehabilitate the poor perception of 
judicial independence, their uncertain language and standards are 
ineffective in achieving this goal.  
3. States with Recusal Statutes Explicitly Covering Campaign 
Contributions 
There are only two states that fit into the category of states with 
statutes explicitly requiring recusal in cases involving judges’ 
campaign contributors: Alabama and California.160 Alabama’s statute 
“require[s] the recusal of a justice or judge from hearing a case in 
which there may be an appearance of impropriety because as a 
candidate the justice or judge received a substantial contribution from 
a party to the case, including attorneys for the party.”161 This 
language merely represents the broad contours of the state’s handling 
of judicial recusal. The next section of the Alabama Code explicitly 
states that if one party or that party’s attorney has contributed over 
$4,000 to the assigned appellate judge (or $2,000 to a trial court 
judge) and the other party has not, the judge must recuse so long as 
the other party requests such a recusal.162 Similarly, California’s 
recently enacted statute163 provides that the judge shall recuse himself 
or herself if: 
The judge [whether appellate or trial court] has received a 
contribution in excess of one thousand five hundred dollars 
                                                                                                                 
158 MISS. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(2) cmt. (2002) (emphasis added). 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 106–08.  
160 See ALA. CODE §§ 12–24–1, 12–24–2 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring recusal if “as a 
candidate [a] justice or judge received a substantial contribution from a party to the case” and 
requiring judges and attorneys to disclose certain campaign contributions); CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 170.1(a)(9)(A) (2006, Supp. 2011) (requiring disqualification if a judge has received a 
campaign contribution from a party or a lawyer in certain circumstances). The Alabama statute 
is not yet in force since the Department of Justice has not pre-cleared it yet for consistency with 
the Voting Rights Act. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 147, at 3–4 (citing Ala. Jud. Inquiry 
Comm., Advisory Op. 99–725 (1999)). For a history of the non-enforcement of the Alabama 
recusal law, see Little v. Strange, No. 2:11–CV–107–WKW [WO], 2011 WL 2462649, at *4–7, 
*11 (M.D. Ala. June 21, 2011) (per curiam) (3-judge panel) (dismissing Voting Rights Act 
challenge to law’s enforceability).  
161 ALA. CODE § 12–24–1 (LexisNexis 2005).  
162 ALA. CODE § 12–24–2 (LexisNexis 2005).  
163 See 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 686 (2010) (outlining the legislative history of the statute 
and its enactment during the 2010 legislative session).  
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($1,500) from a party or lawyer in the proceeding, and either 
of the following applies: 
(i) The contribution was received in support of the 
judge’s last election, if the last election was within 
the last six years. 
(ii) The contribution was received in anticipation of 
an upcoming election.164 
Both Alabama’s and California’s recusal statutes represent the best 
statutory solution for preserving judicial independence in state court 
systems with elected judges. Although these two states have adopted 
strong and explicit statutes on judicial recusal, they are in the distinct 
minority among the thirty-nine states holding judicial elections. Most 
states have failed to view campaign contributions as permissible 
grounds for judicial recusal.165 Furthermore, even the explicit statutes 
and ethics provisions enacted by Alabama, Arizona, California, and 
Utah fail to address the impact that independent expenditures and 
campaign contributions from interest groups have on judicial 
campaigns. The most logical conclusion from such statutory and 
ethics code treatment is that state legislatures are not adequately 
addressing the influence that judicial campaign contributions have 
upon the perception of judicial independence.166 
III. THE DEFICIENCIES OF PROPOSED REMEDIES 
Scholars and bar associations have sought to remove the influence 
of campaign money from the courtroom in a variety of ways. Three of 
the most discussed and used proposals are: abolishing judicial 
elections altogether, setting contribution limits and restrictions, and 
shielding contributors’ identities from judicial candidates. The 
following describes these proposals and offers reasons why they are 
                                                                                                                 
164 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(9)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). The California 
statute also states that campaign contributions to a judge for less than $1,500 may require 
recusal. Id. § 170.1(a)(9)(B) (referencing alternative grounds for disqualification). In 
circumstances where the litigant or attorney of record provided a campaign contribution under 
$1,500, then the judge must recuse himself or herself if the contribution, “[f]or any reason” 
leads the judge to believe either that “his or her recusal would further the interests of justice” or 
that “there is substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial.” Id. § 170.1(a)(6).  
165 See supra Part II.B.1. 
166 Commentators have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., 
FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 20 (2008) (observing that the states have 
“systematically underused and underenforced” judicial recusal provisions), available at 
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/Brennancenterrecusalreport.pdf. 
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either ineffective or impractical solutions to the problem of perceived 
judicial bias in state court systems.  
A. Abolishing Judicial Elections 
A number of commentators have argued that judicial independence 
is so threatened by judicial elections that the practice needs to be 
eliminated in favor of a strictly appointive system.167 In fact, some 
commentators have been calling for the appointment of judges since 
the early twentieth century.168 Supporters of abolishing judicial 
elections claim that systems with appointed judges avoid “problems 
inherent to an elected judiciary.”169 These problems include “the 
appearance of impropriety caused by judges taking money from those 
who appear before them” and the “threat to judicial independence 
resulting from a judge’s dependence on campaign contributions and 
party support . . . .”170 They also rely on evidence suggesting that 
voters lack information in judicial elections and are unable to 
adequately assess judicial qualifications, which render judicial 
elections an ineffective form of judicial selection.171  
There is certainly a normative attraction to abolishing judicial 
elections. It has been noted that “[a]s long as the system of lawyer-
financed judicial elections continues to exist, public respect for the 
integrity of the judicial system will be difficult to maintain, and 
perceptions of bias and unfairness will continue.”172 This proposed 
solution completely removes this difficulty, since there would no 
longer be any contributions by lawyers or litigants to judicial 
candidates. It is clearly a defensible solution and it would remove the 
threat to judicial independence posed by campaign contributions.173  
Although abolishing elections is a strong proposal for fixing the 
problem of campaign contributions in judicial elections, it fails as a 
practical solution. As the Conference of Chief Justices has stated, 
                                                                                                                 
167 See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 276 (advocating the elimination of 
judicial elections).  
168 See, e.g., Stuart H. Perry, Shall We Appoint Our Judges?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. 
& SOC. SCI., Sept. 1935, at 97, 98 (arguing that the City of Detroit should end its practice of 
electing judges in favor of an appointive system).  
169 Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 304. 
170 Id. 
171 See CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 1 (2009) (“Critics . . . question whether citizens are capable of assessing judicial 
qualifications . . . .”); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 290–95 (analyzing data to arrive 
at the conclusion that the public lacks sufficient information to make informed decisions in 
judicial elections).  
172 Boutrous & Hungar, supra note 40, at 84.  
173 Although it should also be stated that other threats to judicial independence will 
continue to exist, even without judicial elections. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 16, at 137–38.  
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“Whatever one’s view of the desirability of judicial elections, a 
generation of experience . . . makes it clear that elections will stay in 
many and perhaps all of the states that have that system.”174 
The Conference of Chief Justices’ conclusion is derived from the 
history of judicial campaigns and the recent failure of state voters to 
approve referenda creating appointive judicial selection procedures. 
Immediately after the nation’s founding, federal and state 
constitutional framers sought to ensure that judges were removed 
from electoral pressure.175 As such, both Article III and its original 
counterparts in state constitutions provided for some form of 
appointive judicial system.176 This early support in state constitutions 
for appointive judicial selections, however, was short-lived and 
started to crack in 1812 when Georgia became the first state to 
provide for the popular election of state judges.177 After this point, the 
general trend among the states was to shed appointive judicial 
selection in favor of judicial elections.178 This shedding of appointive 
judicial selection developed due to the Jacksonian philosophy179 that 
saw judicial appointments as “aristocratic mistrust of the people”180 
and inconsistent with the “core value” of “distrust of 
unrepresentative, unaccountable government officers.”181 The result 
of this trend has rendered judicial elections “ingrained in our 
system.”182 Moreover, elective judicial selection is so entrenched that 
its extensive use continues despite “widespread public and legislative 
awareness of the concerns inspired by judicial elections . . . .”183  
The strong historical foundation underlying judicial elections has 
manifested itself in voters’ rejection of referenda to abolish judicial 
elections in favor of appointive selection systems. According to the 
American Judicature Society, voters in Florida, Nevada, Ohio, 
                                                                                                                 
174 Declaration: Judicial Elections are Different from other Elections, CONFERENCE OF 
CHIEF JUSTICES, 
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/JudicialSelectionResolutions/DeclarationJudicialElections.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
175 David K. Stott, Comment, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and 
Impartiality Through Recusal Reform, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 481, 484. 
176 See id. (explaining that due to the Framers’ concerns over the “runaway whims of the 
people,” they viewed “judicial independence [as] the bedrock principle of Article III”) (footnote 
omitted).  
177 Shepherd, supra note 8, at 630. 
178 See id. at 631 (describing the historical trend of states moving towards judicial 
elections).  
179 See BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 171, at 5 (attributing the rise of judicial elections to 
Jacksonian democracy). 
180 Stott, supra note 175, at 485. 
181 Shepherd, supra note 8, at 631. 
182 Stott, supra note 175, at 485. 
183 FLAMM, supra note 26, § 9.4, at 241. 
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Pennsylvania, and South Dakota have all voted down referenda that 
would abolish judicial elections and replace them with merit selection 
plans.184 Many of these referenda have rejected abolishing judicial 
elections by overwhelming margins. For instance, in 1987, Ohio 
voters rejected a plan to end judicial elections for appellate judges by 
a margin of 65 percent to 35 percent,185 and in 2004, South Dakota 
voters similarly rejected such a plan by a margin of 62 percent to 38 
percent.186 Not only have voters rejected the abolition of judicial 
elections, but some have voted to abolish appointive systems in favor 
of partisan judicial elections.187  
Such lopsided results have deterred lawmakers from further 
exploration of abandoning judicial elections. Consider the example of 
Florida. In 2000, the state administered an election that was so close it 
took more than a month to resolve,188 and another that was such a 
blowout it took an evening to settle. The blowout occurred on a 
referendum in which voters had the option of abolishing competitive 
judicial elections in favor of appointive judicial selection. Each 
county’s voters “overwhelmingly rejected” the referendum with an 
average affirmative vote of only 32 percent in favor of the 
referendum.189 In light of this defeat, no further legislative action was 
taken to remove judicial elections in favor of appointive selection.190 
                                                                                                                 
184 Judicial Campaigns and Elections – History of Reform Efforts, AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/failed_reform_efforts 
.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  
185 General Election Overview: Nov. 3, 1987, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/1980-1989OfficialElectionResults/ 
GenElectOverview11031987.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). The measure only won in eight of 
Ohio’s eighty-eight counties. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 184.  
186 See 2004 Election Information – General Election Official Returns for Ballot 
Questions, S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://sdsos.gov/content/viewcontent.aspx?cat=elections&pg=/elections/pastelections_electionin
fo04_GEballotquestionreturns.shtm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (providing the vote count); 2004 
Election Information – Ballot Texts and Attorney General Questions, S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://sdsos.gov/content/viewcontent.aspx?cat=elections&pg=/elections/pastelections_electionin
fo04_ballotquestiontextsAGexplanations.shtm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (providing the text of 
the rejected constitutional amendment). The measure only acquired a majority in one of the 
state’s 66 counties. 2004 Election Information – General Election Official Returns for Ballot 
Questions, S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://sdsos.gov/content/viewcontent.aspx?cat=elections&pg=/elections/pastelections_electionin
fo04_GEballotquestionreturns.shtm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
187 Two counties in Kansas voted in 1980 and 1984 to end the use of appointive selection 
for local trial judges in favor of a return to partisan elections. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra 
note 184.  
188 See Richard L. Berke, Who Won Florida? The Answer Emerges, but Surely Not the 
Final Word, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A16 (describing the tumult that Florida’s results 
created in the 2000 presidential election).  
189 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 184. 
190 Merit Selection and Retention, THE FORIDA BAR, 
https://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/BIPS2001.nsf/1119bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/
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The enormity of the threat posed to judicial independence by 
elected judges hearing cases that involve their campaign contributors 
certainly invites an extreme proposal such as the abolition of judicial 
elections. Although this proposal would remove such a threat, it is 
one that is not practically achievable based on this nation’s history of 
democratizing the bench and voters’ recent rejection of referenda to 
end judicial elections. As such, abolishing judicial elections is an 
impractical solution better suited for the law school classroom than 
for the real world composed of actual voters. 
B. Barring Contributions by Attorneys 
Some bar associations have attempted to reduce the appearance of 
impropriety created when judges hear cases involving their campaign 
supporters by barring lawyers from contributing to judicial 
campaigns.191 In fact, the ABA codified such a ban in its ethics code 
until 1972.192 Additionally, some have argued that an attorney 
contribution ban to judicial campaigns should become the modern 
norm across the nation.193 An attorney contribution ban would clearly 
be effective in battling one symptom of the perceived lack of judicial 
independence: judges hearing cases in which the attorneys are also 
the judges’ campaign donors. However, this proposal suffers from 
several flaws that render the proposal ineffective and impractical. As 
such, an attorney contribution ban is ill-suited for the purpose of 
strengthening judicial independence in state court systems with 
elected judges.  
There are three reasons the attorney contribution ban proposal is 
ineffective. First, the proposal fails to address, even cursorily, the 
improprieties created by judges hearing cases in which either litigants 
                                                                                                                 
 
db7173e85a333f978525669e004d01f3!OpenDocument (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  
191 See Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining 
the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 
71, 82 (1997) (describing the Bar Association of Greater Cleveland’s ban on lawyer 
contributions to judicial candidates in the mid-1970s); Aman Mcleod, If at First You Don’t 
Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial Selection Reform Efforts,107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 
521 (2005) (describing the Illinois bar’s contribution ban for attorneys). 
192 See FLAMM, supra note 26, § 9.4, at 246 (“Canon 32 of the Model Canons of Judicial 
Ethics mandated that judges not accept presents or favors from litigants or from lawyers 
practicing before them. [This Canon combined with Canon 30,] which generally prohibited a 
candidate from doing anything to create the impression that, if elected, he would administer his 
office with bias or improper discrimination, effectively precluded a judicial candidate from 
receiving even the smallest campaign contribution from attorneys.”).  
193 See, e.g., Bradley A. Siciliano, Note, Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns: 
Creating the Appearance of Impropriety, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 239–40 (1991) (advocating 
an attorney contribution ban).  
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or groups whose interests are implicated in the litigation are also the 
judges’ campaign donors. Second, an attorney contribution ban may 
shift even more influence in judicial campaigns to special interest 
groups and other wealthy actors. For instance, the ABA abolished 
their attorney contribution ban once it observed that the ban gave 
newspapers, political parties, and other special interests greater 
control in judicial campaigns.194 There is little reason to doubt that 
such a shift in influence will reoccur, especially in light of interest 
groups’ increased spending in judicial campaigns.195 Third, an 
outright attorney contribution ban would be overinclusive. For 
example, such a ban would include transactional attorneys despite the 
likelihood that they would never appear before the judge to argue a 
case.196   
Additionally, the attorney contribution ban may be impractical as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White197 and its progeny among the lower courts.198 
White struck down a Minnesota judicial ethics provision that 
precluded judicial candidates from “announc[ing] his or her view on 
disputed legal or political issues.”199 Since this “announce clause” 
involved First Amendment rights, the Court majority applied strict 
scrutiny, which required Minnesota to carry the heavy burden of 
showing that the clause was “narrowly tailored” to a “compelling 
state interest.”200 In applying this test, the Court ruled that the clause 
may advance the interest of fostering judicial impartiality, but that 
                                                                                                                 
194 FLAMM, supra note 26, § 9.4, at 246.  
195 See supra Part I.B, Table 3.  
196 See Siciliano, supra note 193, at 222 n.36 (noting that corporate attorneys rarely appear 
in front of judges and therefore have little to gain personally from contributing to a judicial 
campaign). 
197 536 U.S. 765 (2002); see also Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 276 (“[Campaign 
finance reform] changes . . . face significant constitutional hurdles . . . . .”).  
198 See, e.g., Cary v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 209 (6th Cir. 2010) (invalidating Kentucky 
statutes prohibiting judges from disclosing party affiliation, soliciting campaign funds, or 
making statements that could be reasonably interpreted as committing to vote in a specific way 
on a specific issue); Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 841–42 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
Minnesota Judicial ethics codes limiting endorsement of other candidates and campaign fund 
solicitation are unconstitutional under Republic Party of Minnesota v. White); Kan. Judicial 
Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1234, 1240 (D. Kan. 2006) (holding that the Kansas 
Judicial Ethics Code’s cannons prohibiting a judge from making pledges or making statements 
which may indicated how a judge will rule in the future is unconstitutional); Alaska Right to 
Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (D. Alaska 2005) (holding 
that Judicial Ethics Code provisions restricting judicial candidates from responding to surveys 
are constitutional); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044–45 
(D.N.D. 2005) (holding that judicial ethics canons that restrict judge from speaking on issues 
that may appear before the court are unconstitutional). 
199 MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002).  
200 White, 536 U.S. at 774–75. 
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the interest was not compelling.201 The Court also found that the 
clause only aided impartiality in that it merely restricted speech 
related to issues, not speech related to particular parties.202 In 
addition, the Court ruled that the clause was underinclusive since it 
only applied to a small amount of judicial candidates’ speech.203 As 
such, the Court found that the clause failed the tailoring prong of the 
strict scrutiny test and, therefore, violated the First Amendment.204 
Justice Scalia, the author of White’s majority opinion, limited the 
scope of the decision simply to Minnesota’s and other states’ 
announce clauses,205 which were extremely uncommon at the time of 
the decision.206 Despite White’s limited scope and lack of effect on 
most states’ judicial ethics codes, lower courts have broadly read the 
decision to either “strik[e] down or weaken[] numerous judicial 
speech regulations . . . .”207 A variety of cases show that such a trend 
has developed among lower federal courts.208 Essentially, “[c]ourts 
and states appear to think that if White found announce clauses 
unconstitutional, other state restrictions on judicial campaign 
speech—anything from fraudulent or misleading speech to 
solicitation of campaign contributions—must be unconstitutional as 
well.”209  
In the face of this trend, it is quite possible that lower courts will 
view a flat attorney contribution ban as a violation of the First 
Amendment. Such a ban implicates campaign speech, which would 
necessitate the application of strict scrutiny, and probably lead to the 
ban’s invalidation. This result is even more likely in light of the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Citizens United that there is “no basis 
for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the 
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored 
                                                                                                                 
201 See id. at 777 (“Impartiality in this sense may well be an interest served by the 
announce clause, but it is not a compelling state interest, as strict scrutiny requires.”) (emphasis 
in the original). 
202 Id.  
203 See id. at 779–80 (reasoning that a judicial candidate may state his or her position on an 
issue prior to announcing their candidacy, and after he or she is elected prior to a pending 
litigation). 
204 Id. at 788. 
205 Id. at 768 (describing the issue presented in White as “whether the First Amendment 
permits the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State 
from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues”).  
206 See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 
1095 n.77 (2007) (“This same canon was law in only nine states . . . ”).  
207 Stott, supra note 175, at 495. 
208 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 198. 
209 Stott, supra note 175, at 497. 
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speakers.”210 As such, the attorney contribution ban is impractical due 
to its dubious constitutional standing.  
C. Shielding the Identity of Contributors from Judicial Candidates 
The final proposed solution to the problem of judges hearing their 
campaign supporters’ cases is to shield the judges from learning the 
identity of their campaign contributors. A number of jurisdictions 
have endorsed this approach, codifying the requirement that judicial 
candidates’ campaign committees must make reasonable efforts to 
prevent the candidate from learning the identity of his or her financial 
supporters.211 This proposal, like the ones described above, also fails 
due to its lack of effectiveness and lack of practicality.  
It seems apparent that “it would be unrealistic to believe that 
candidates are not aware of who is helping to run their campaigns.”212 
For example, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a judicial 
candidate’s campaign committee organizes a fundraising dinner for 
the campaign. Since this is a campaign activity, it is likely that the 
candidate himself or herself would appear to thank those in 
attendance for coming. In such a scenario, the candidate would know 
who came to the fundraiser as well as the cost of attendance. 
Furthermore, campaign committee reports, including those of judicial 
candidates, are publicly available; it is not difficult to imagine a 
judicial candidate accessing such a report, even if his campaign 
committee keeps it from him or her.213 Thus, in both of these 
scenarios, the proposal of shielding judicial candidates from learning 
the identities of their campaign supporters is rendered entirely 
ineffective. Additionally, the proposal is possibly impractical for the 
same reason that an attorney contribution ban is possibly impractical: 
it may run afoul of White and its application by lower courts.214  
                                                                                                                 
210 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).  
211 See, e.g., ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4, R. 4.1(A)(8) (2009) (codifying such a 
shielding requirement by prohibiting personal solicitation of campaign funds other than through 
a campaign committee). 
212 FLAMM, supra note 26, § 9.4, at 248.  
213 See Campaign Finance - Online Database, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Campaign%20Finance/Database.aspz (last visited Oct. 17, 
2011). Through this database, users are able to access all publicly filed campaign finance 
reports. Id. 
214 See, e.g., Cary v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 194 (6th Cir. 2010) (invalidating a judicial 
solicitation ban because it is “incompatible” with White); Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 826 
(8th Cir. 2010) (holding that under White a ban on judicial solicitation and endorsement was 
unconstitutional under White). In Wolnitzek, the Sixth Circuit held that Kentucky’s solicitation 
ban was not narrowly tailored to important governmental interests. The court noted that the ban 
favored certain judicial candidates, such as incumbents, wealthy, and insider candidates over 
others and they covered a wide range of activities from personal solicitations to mass mailers. 
Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d at 204–05. It also observed that the ban did “little to protect [Kentucky’s] 
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In summary, three of the most discussed remedies for problems 
associated with campaign contributions and judicial independence 
are: (1) outright abolition of judicial elections; (2) barring 
contributions by attorneys; and (3) shielding contributors’ identities 
from candidates. The abolition of judicial elections is impractical 
because it is unlikely that it would receive enough support among 
policymakers or voters. Barring attorneys’ contributions to judicial 
candidates, meanwhile, would be ineffective because this proposal 
does not address the influence of interest groups and wealthy litigants. 
A contribution ban could also be impractical due to its dubious 
constitutionality under White. Finally, a proposal to shield 
contributors’ identities from judicial candidates would be ineffective 
because candidates could easily discover who their contributors are 
despite the shielding activities. Moreover, this proposal may also be 
unconstitutional under White. Due to the deficiencies of these 
proposed remedies, it is necessary that policymakers and courts look 
to recusal as a better option.  
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE TREATMENT OF CAPERTON AND A NEW 
STATUTORY APPROACH FOR THE STATES 
The Supreme Court and the states have failed to adequately 
delineate the circumstances requiring recusal. This has led to the 
underutilization of recusal as means of addressing the problem of 
judges hearing cases involving campaign contributors. Furthermore, 
other potential remedies to the problem have fatal flaws that would 
prevent them from either being adopted or effective. As such, it is 
necessary for the Supreme Court to read Caperton expansively to find 
that due process requires recusal in less extreme circumstances than 
those present in that case and for the states to adopt a new statutory 
approach to recusal.  
A. Recusal is the Best Proposed Solution 
A solution requiring judges to recuse themselves in cases 
involving their campaign contributors is both effective and practical. 
Recusal is an effective remedy because it would prevent judges from 
hearing cases involving their campaign contributors, reducing the 
                                                                                                                 
 
interests” since the ban allowed the judicial candidate’s close associates to ask attorneys and 
other litigants who are frequently before the court for contributions. Id. at 205. The Wersal court 
utilized the same reasoning when striking down Minnesota’s personal judicial solicitation ban. 
Wersal, 613 F.3d at 840–41. Any solicitation ban is likely to present these concerns and courts 
following the Wolnitzek and Wersal courts’ view are likely to strike other bans down.  
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public’s perception that state courts with elected judges lack 
independence. Removing this factor should correspondingly produce 
greater confidence in the judiciary’s independence.  
More importantly, recusal is a practical solution that should pass 
constitutional muster and generate widespread support among 
policymakers. A recusal-based solution would avoid the application 
of strict scrutiny or the implication of the White line of cases 
described above because recusal “is an ex post remedy tailored to the 
specific factual situation [of a case, so] recusal does not trigger the 
same First Amendment scrutiny as canons limiting political speech or 
activity.”215 As such, it would only need to pass the more easily 
satisfied intermediate scrutiny test of substantial relation to important 
governmental interests.216 Fostering an independent judiciary is an 
important governmental interest, so that prong of intermediate 
scrutiny is most likely satisfied.217 Furthermore, a recusal-based 
solution would be substantially related to the fostering of an 
independent judiciary in that it would remove judges from cases in 
which campaign contributors have an interest in the outcome.218 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has indicated its willingness to 
countenance stronger recusal statutes and standards than those 
required by the Constitution.219  
Moreover, a stronger recusal statute is practical because it should 
receive significant support among policymakers of every political 
persuasion. Two states with statutes explicitly requiring recusal in 
cases involving judges’ campaign contributors are Alabama and 
California, which have little in common. The states are politically 
different,220 culturally different,221 and demographically different.222 
                                                                                                                 
215 Sample & Pozen, supra note 63, at 19; see also Stott, supra note 175, at 504 (arguing 
that recusal “only incidentally burden[s] campaign speech”).  
216 See Stott, supra note 175, at 504 (arguing that recusal policies “only incidentally burden 
campaign speech,” and noting that “[t]he standard for ‘incidental burdens’ is similar to 
intermediate scrutiny . . . ”). 
217 The Supreme Court has provided some support for this view of an independent 
judiciary as a compelling interest. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776 
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Judicial integrity is . . . a state interest of the highest order.”).  
218 See Stott, supra note 175, at 505–06 (arguing that a recusal solution for judicial speech 
regulations would satisfy intermediate scrutiny).  
219 See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that states may 
“adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires . . . ”); cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986) (“Congress and the states . . . remain free to impose more 
rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than those … mandated here today.”).  
220 For example, in the 2008 Election, sixty-one percent of California voted for Barack 
Obama for President. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE NOVEMBER 4, 2008, 
GENERAL ELECTION 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf. In the same year, 
however, only thirty-nine percent of Alabama voted for Obama. STATE OF ALA., CANVASS OF 
RESULTS: GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 4, 2008 3 (2008), available at 
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Yet, despite these significant differences, both states drafted and 
enacted similar judicial recusal statutes. Furthermore, the California 
Assembly’s unanimous enactment and the California Senate’s 
subsequent adoption of its recusal statute may suggest that such 
statutes would enjoy widespread support in other state legislatures.223 
Consequently, a recusal statute like the ones adopted by Alabama and 
California “represents a simple, straightforward, and easily 
implemented response to the serious problems posed by” judges 
hearing cases involving their campaign contributors.224 
B. Treatment of Caperton 
For a recusal-based solution to be effective, the Supreme Court 
needs to expand its application of the Caperton standard. The first 
improvement that the standard requires is, as suggested by Chief 
Justice Roberts’ dissent, greater definition.225 Caperton’s result stands 
for the proposition that campaign contributions should not be allowed 
to threaten the appearance of elected judges’ impartiality.226 As such, 
the spirit of Caperton should counsel the Court to answer Chief 
Justice Roberts’ questions in ways that lead to recusal in situations 
less extreme than the one present in Caperton.  
                                                                                                                 
 
http://www.sos.alabama.gov/downloads/election/2008/general/statecert-2008-general-election-
11-25-2008-without-write-in-appendix.pdf. 
221 See Anita Gates, Just a Home Girl Like Me, With Roots in Two Americas, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2002, at A13 (discussing cultural differences between places like Alabama and 
California).  
222 For instance, consider the state’s respective racial demographics. Alabama’s racial 
breakdown is 70.4 percent white and 26.2 percent African-American while California’s racial 
breakdown is 60.9 percent white (56.6 percent of which is of Latino origin), 6.2 percent black, 
and 12.3 percent Asian. ALABAMA ACS DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSING ESTIMATES: 2006–2008 
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US01&-
qr_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_DP3YR5&-context=adp&-ds_name=&-tree_id=3308&-
_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-format=; CALIFORNIA-ACS DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSING 
ESTIMATES: 2006-2008, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&-context=adp&-
qr_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_DP3YR5&-ds_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_&-
tree_id=3308&-redoLog=false&-_caller=geoselect&-geo_id=04000US06&-format=&-
_lang=en. Note that the numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding and exclusion of 
other less statistically significant racial groups.  
223 CAL. ASSEMB. DAILY JOURNAL, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess., at 6160–61 (2010); CAL. S. 
DAILY JOURNAL, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess., at 4298 (2010). 
224 Boutrous & Hungar, supra note 40, at 85. 
225 For a discussion of Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, see supra Part II.A.2.c. Even Justice 
Kennedy implies in Caperton that the standard may be imprecise. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009) (noting that “sometimes no administrable standard may 
be available to address [a case’s] perceived wrong”).  
226 See Sample, supra note 81, at 789 (arguing that Caperton has had the effect of 
“protecting the courts from the influence of money”).  
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Most notably, the Court should find that a “campaign 
contribution” includes both contributions to the candidate’s campaign 
committee and independent expenditures. This conclusion flows 
naturally from the observation that “[i]n modern electoral politics . . . 
independent expenditures assisting candidates may be as important as 
direct campaign contributions, [and] sometimes more important.”227 
Additionally, the Court should consider the aggregate of a person’s 
contributions to a judge’s campaign fund and independent 
expenditures in support of that judge’s campaign as “substantial” 
whenever it reaches the point of five to ten percent of the judge’s total 
campaign expenditures and above. It is a common axiom that losing 
that percentage of revenue is noticeable to the revenue loser, and will 
cause serious financial health questions.228 Furthermore, contributions 
to either a judge’s past or future campaign should be considered, 
since it is likely that a judge will feel indebted to both his her past and 
future benefactors. 
The Court should not place much weight on the fact that Justice 
Benjamin was the deciding vote in Caperton. It should not matter in 
the analysis whether a judge who was biased toward his or her 
campaign supporter was joined by others in his or her ruling. The 
mere participation of a biased judge, regardless of the case’s outcome 
or the margin by which that outcome was reached, renders the ruling 
violative of due process.229 Allowing a biased judge to continue to sit 
in a case and to hand down rulings without consequence would do 
little to preserve the appearance of judicial impartiality or to improve 
the public’s view of judicial independence.  
To further ensure that the spirit of Caperton is followed, the Court 
should adopt the following judicial presumption:  
In the absence of contrary evidence, a substantial campaign 
contribution by an attorney of record, litigant, or interest 
group in the form of either direct donations to the judge’s 
campaign committee or independent expenditures requires 
that the judge recuse himself or herself from hearing the case. 
If the judge does not recuse himself of herself in these 
situations and the party opposing recusal does not present 
contrary evidence, then the Court reverses the court below’s 
                                                                                                                 
227 Stempel, supra note 105, at 31 (internal quotations and footnote omitted). 
228 See id. at 28 (“Where a particular person, entity, or alliance provides more than five to 
ten percent or more of campaign spending, reasonable people get concerned.”).  
229 See id. at 39 (arguing that the “mere participation of a tainted judge requires vacating 
the decision . . . ”).  
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decision even if the judge’s vote was not outcome-
determinative.  
A “substantial contribution” is one that is at least ten percent of all 
the expenditures of both a judicial candidate’s campaign committee 
and independent groups advocating for the judicial candidate. 
Moreover, for donations or independent expenditures by an interest 
group to give rise to the presumption, the interest group must either 
be a party to the litigation or file an amicus brief on behalf of a 
litigant.230 Contrary evidence that could defeat the presumption 
includes evidence that the litigant, attorney, or interest group that 
provided a substantial contribution to the judge’s campaign also gave 
financial support to the judge’s opponent. Other possible contrary 
evidence is a showing that both litigants, attorneys of record for both 
parties, or interest groups filing amicus briefs on behalf of both 
parties provided substantial contributions to the judge’s campaign. 
This presumption has three key benefits. First, it makes the 
Caperton standard more concrete and should allow the Court to reach 
uniform results in future recusal cases. The presumption addresses 
Chief Justice Roberts’ criticisms by defining what type of 
contributors, what sort and level of contribution, and what class of 
judges the Caperton standard implicates.231  
Second, the presumption reaches more situations than the 
“extreme” one present in Caperton.232 Unlike in Caperton, a 
campaign contributor need not provide more than 50 percent of a 
judge’s campaign spending or millions of dollars to invoke the 
presumption. 233 Rather, a more commonplace contribution is all that 
is necessary to trigger the presumption.234 For instance, take the 
following circumstance. A litigant donates $1,000 to the appellate 
judge’s previous campaign and spends $9,000 in independent 
                                                                                                                 
230 This requirement removes Chief Justice Roberts’s worry that there is too little 
definition as to when interest groups’ support implicates the Caperton standard. See Caperton, 
129 S. Ct. at 2270 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“What if the supporter is not a party to the 
pending or imminent case, but his interests will be affected by the decision?”).  
231 See supra Part II.A.2.c.  
232 See supra text accompanying notes 106–08. Blankenship’s fundraising on behalf of 
Justice Benjamin was so extreme that he was the only individual contributor listed among the 
major fundraisers for judicial elections in the most expensive states. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 78–85 (summarizing the largest fundraisers from 2000 to 2009 in states with the most 
expensive judicial elections). Indeed, only five groups provided more money to all judicial 
candidates in the most expensive states than Blankenship provided only to Justice Benjamin. Id. 
at 78–80, 82.  
233 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (describing 
Blakenship’s $3 million in campaign contributions and independent expenditures on behalf of 
Justice Benjamin’s election campaign).  
234 This is just a representative example. Many other similar types of situations could 
invoke the presumption.  
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expenditures on behalf of the judge’s campaign. Funds derived from 
the judge’s campaign committee and independent expenditures total 
$100,000. Thus, the presumption is invoked and the party opposing 
recusal must show contrary evidence to establish that recusal is 
unwarranted. This type of situation is more likely to occur than the 
extreme scenario presented in Capteron, but it presents the same 
threat to judicial independence.235 As such, it is the type of situation 
that the Supreme Court’s recusal jurisprudence should reach.  
Third, the presumption should lead to fewer instances of judges 
hearing cases that involve their campaign supporters. Employing this 
presumption puts campaign contributors and elected judges on notice 
that recusal is necessary in far less extreme situations than those 
present in Caperton. This would naturally lead more judges to recuse 
themselves on the basis of campaign contributions. One of the reasons 
underlying the public’s poor perception of judicial independence is 
starkly diminished by reducing the incidence of judges hearing cases 
that involve their campaign supporters236 
The judicial presumption that this Note advances would greatly 
enhance the Supreme Court’s recusal jurisprudence. The presumption 
provides greater definition to the Caperton standard and makes 
Caperton’s application to less extreme cases operational. 
Additionally, the presumption advances the important policy goal of 
reducing the appearance of impropriety that results from judges 
hearing cases that involve their campaign contributors. Thus, the 
Court, and other judicial bodies with the responsibility of handling 
recusal situations involving campaign contributions, should adopt this 
presumption.  
C. Model Recusal Statute 
While vigilant Supreme Court action in situations requiring recusal 
will help to improve judicial independence, the Court’s action by 
itself will not adequately address the appearance of impropriety 
created by judges hearing cases involving their campaign 
contributors. State legislative action is also necessary, especially due 
to the states’ failure to adopt effective recusal statutes.237 The 
                                                                                                                 
235 This example is more like Duane Adams’s story as opposed to the extreme one 
presented by Blankenship’s involvement in West Virginia Supreme Court elections. Despite the 
lower amounts of campaign money involved in Adams’ story, he still felt like the Ohio Supreme 
Court lacked independence in his case. See supra text accompanying notes 9–20.  
236 See supra Part I.C (discussing the public’s poor perception of the judiciary as a result of 
increased campaign spending).  
237 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing state statutes with no recusal requirement when a 
judge hears a case involving campaign contributors).  
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examples of Alabama and California provide a strong starting point 
for a model statute requiring recusal in certain cases involving 
campaign contributions.238 Although those states’ statutes offer a 
good starting point, they are not exhaustive sources for a model 
statute since they still leave unresolved many of the questions 
presented in Chief Justice Roberts’ Caperton dissent. Thus, drawing 
from the language found in the Alabama and California statutes and 
the concerns raised in Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent, the following 
model statute is an appropriate and effective response to the threat 
posed by campaign contributions to judicial independence: 
Section 1. General Provision. Pursuant to the requirements of 
this Act, a trial or appellate judge shall recuse himself or 
herself from hearing and ruling on cases involving the 
financial supporters of his or her election campaigns.  
Section 2. Litigant-Campaign Supporters. A judge shall 
recuse himself or herself when one party to the case before 
the judge has provided any of the following types of financial 
contributions in support of the judge’s election:  
A. A contribution of $2,000 or more to the judge’s 
campaign fund in either the judge’s preceding 
campaign for the judgeship that he or she now 
occupies or the judge’s upcoming campaign for a 
judgeship or other elective office; 
B. A contribution of $2,000 or more to a Political 
Action Committee or independent group that either 
donated money to the judge’s campaign fund or spent 
money in support of the judge in either the judge’s 
preceding campaign for the judgeship that he or she 
now occupies or the judge’s upcoming campaign for 
a judgeship or other elective office; or 
C. An independent expenditure of $2,000 or more in 
support of either the judge’s preceding election to the 
judgeship that he or she now occupies or the judge’s 
upcoming campaign for a judgeship or other elective 
office.  
                                                                                                                 
238 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the California and Alabama statutes).  
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Section 3. Attorney-Campaign Supporters. A judge shall 
recuse himself or herself when the attorney of record for one 
party to the case before the judge has provided any of the 
following types of financial contributions in support of the 
judge’s election:  
A. A contribution of $2,000 or more to the judge’s 
campaign fund in either the judge’s preceding 
campaign for the judgeship that he or she now 
occupies or the judge’s upcoming campaign for a 
judgeship or other elective office; 
B. A contribution of $2,000 or more to a Political 
Action Committee or independent group that either 
donated money to the judge’s campaign fund or spent 
money in support of the judge in either the judge’s 
preceding campaign for the judgeship that he or she 
now occupies or the judge’s upcoming campaign for 
a judgeship or other elective office; or 
C. An independent expenditure of $2,000 or more in 
support of either the judge’s preceding election to the 
judgeship that he or she now occupies or the judge’s 
upcoming campaign for a judgeship or other elective 
office.  
Section 4. Independent Group-Campaign Supporters. A judge 
shall recuse himself or herself when an independent group, 
labor organization, industry group, or other organization has 
filed a brief in support of one party to the case before the 
judge and has provided any of the following types of 
financial contributions in support of the judge’s election:  
A. A contribution of $2,000 or more to the judge’s 
campaign fund in either the judge’s preceding 
campaign for the judgeship that he or she now 
occupies or the judge’s upcoming campaign for a 
judgeship or other elective office; 
B. A contribution of $2,000 or more to a Political 
Action Committee or independent group that either 
donated money to the judge’s campaign fund or spent 
money in support of the judge in either the judge’s 
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preceding campaign for the judgeship that he or she 
now occupies or the judge’s upcoming campaign for 
a judgeship or other elective office; or 
C. An independent expenditure of $2,000 or more in 
support of either the judge’s preceding election to the 
judgeship that he or she now occupies or the judge’s 
upcoming campaign for a judgeship or other elective 
office.  
Section 5. Definitions. 
A. A “party to the case” includes either a named 
party in the case or a person related to the named 
party by consanguinity or marriage. 
B. The “attorney of record” includes both the 
attorney of record in court records and the law firm 
of that attorney. 
Section 6. Exclusions. A judge shall not recuse himself or 
herself if any of the following occur: 
A. Both parties to the case provided any of the 
contributions described in Section 2-A, 2-B, or 2-C;  
B. The attorneys of record for both parties to the 
case provided any of the contributions described in 
Section 3-A, 3-B, or 3-C; or  
C. There are independent groups, labor 
organizations, industry groups, or other organizations 
that have provided any of the contributions described 
in Section 4-A, 4-B, or 4-C and that have filed briefs 
in support of both parties to the case.  
This model statute creates a $2,000 ceiling for recusal that applies 
regardless of whether the judge is an appellate or trial court judge. As 
such, the model statute is similar to the Mode Code of Judicial 
Conduct,239 the California statute,240 and the Utah judicial ethics 
                                                                                                                 
239 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2011) (requiring recusal if a judge 
learns that he received a campaign contribution over a certain dollar limit from a “party, party’s 
lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer”). 
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provision,241 all of which create one contribution threshold for both 
appellate and trial judges. This threshold can be modified by each 
state to better match its own circumstances.242 For instance, states 
could follow Arizona’s lead and make separate thresholds for 
appellate and trial court judges, based on the maximum contribution 
allowed to statewide and non-statewide candidates.243  
On one level, creating separate ceilings for appellate and trial court 
judges is logical because appellate judges must appeal to larger voter 
demographics and consequently require more money, and more 
contributions, to effectively run their campaigns.244 However, 
policymakers should resist blindly accepting this general trend. Some 
campaigns for trial court judgeships require appealing to as many, or 
even more, voters as campaigns for appellate courts.245 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                 
 
240 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(9)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (requiring recusal 
in certain circumstances if a judge has received over $1,500 from a party). 
241 UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2010) (requiring recusal in certain 
circumstances if a judge received more than fifty dollars from a party).  
242 When Utah decided to adopt the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s provision on 
campaign contributions, it adopted a much lower threshold than this Note’s model statute does. 
Id. It adopted such a low threshold because the state’s practice is to appoint judges, who are then 
subject only to retention elections. As such, judges have less need to raise substantial amounts 
of campaign money. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 147, at 3. The states should take these 
types of dynamics into consideration when adopting and modifying the model recusal statute.  
243 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16–905(A)(2), (4), (B)(1)–(2) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (setting 
different maximum contribution amounts for statewide and non-statewide offices); ARIZ. CODE 
OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2009) (requiring recusal if a judge learns that he has received 
a contribution over the statutory amount); see also ALA. CODE § 12–24–2 (2005) (setting 
different thresholds for appellate and trial court judges). Both states have lower thresholds for 
trial court judges than for appellate court judges.  
244 For example, the Judge of the Vinton County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas may only 
face 4,000 voters or less for his judgeship. See Judge of the Court of Common Pleas: November 
2, 2010, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2010results/20101102commonpleas.
aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (revealing that only 3,296 voters cast ballots in Vinton County 
during the 2010 Election for the Common Pleas judgeship). Meanwhile, the Judge of the Ohio 
Court of Appeals, the state’s intermediate appellate court, for the Fourth District, which includes 
Vinton County, may face 125,000 voters for her judgeship. See Judge of the Court of Appeals: 
November 2, 2010, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2010results/20101102appeals.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (revealing that 122,336 voters cast ballots in the Fourth District 
during the 2010 Election for the Court of Appeals judgeship).  
245 For instance, Judge Dick Ambrose of the Cuyahoga County, Ohio Court of Common 
Pleas faced 316,926 voters who cast ballots in the 2010 Election. Judge of the Court of Common 
Pleas: November 2, 2010, OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2010results/20101102commonpleas.
aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). Meanwhile, Judge Kathleen Keough of the Ohio Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth District, which is contained only within Cuyahoga County, faced 
302,919 voters in the 2010 Election. Judge of the Court of Appeals: November 2, 2010, OHIO 
SEC’Y OF STATE, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2010results/20101102appeals.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011).  
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races for trial court judgeships may require fundraising that is as 
substantial as that of appellate judgeships.246 Thus, states should 
carefully consider, based on the particular fundraising trends of its 
judicial candidates, whether creating separate thresholds for appellate 
and trial court judges is appropriate. 
This Note’s proposed model statute is a vast improvement over the 
current state of recusal law in the states. Unlike the sizable majority 
of states with elected judges, this statute explicitly enumerates 
campaign contributions and independent expenditures as grounds for 
a judge’s recusal.247 As such, the statute avoids the pitfalls of a vague 
recusal standard, which states typically interpret as not requiring 
recusal when a litigant or attorney of record is one of the judge’s 
campaign contributors.248  
Furthermore, the model statute addresses the disproportionate 
impact of independent expenditures in judicial elections249 by 
explicitly requiring recusal for any independent expenditure greater 
than $2,000. Additionally, the statute deals with interest groups’ 
increasing involvement in judicial campaigns250 by outlining the types 
of contributions and expenditures by interest groups that requires 
recusal. In these regards, the model statute goes further than the 
Alabama and California statutes, which are silent on the matter of 
independent expenditures and the involvement of interest groups in 
judicial elections.251  
Most importantly, the statute’s enforcement would reduce the 
number of times that a judge hears a case involving his or her 
campaign contributors, which would help to restore the public’s 
perception of an independent judiciary.252 For example, if the statute 
had been in effect at the time that the Ohio Supreme Court considered 
Maitland v. Ford Motor Company,253 the result of the case could have 
                                                                                                                 
246 See Glaberson, supra note 144 (noting that three candidates for the Manhattan 
Surrogate’s Court raised a combined $900,000 for the Democratic Party’s nomination).  
247 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing statutes without specific reference to campaign 
contributions).  
248 See supra notes 134–42 and accompanying text (discussing case law related to various 
recusal statutes). 
249 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing the extent of independent 
expenditures in judicial elections).  
250 See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.  
251 See supra Part II.B.3 (describing the Alabama and California statutes).  
252 See supra Part I.C (describing the public’s negative perception of the judiciary); see 
also Glaberson, supra note 144 (noting that New York Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman 
implemented a policy barring judges from hearing cases involving campaign contributors 
because “[n]othing [is] more important for the judiciary than to have the public see that we’re 
neutral arbiters of disputes”).  
253 816 N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio 2004). 
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been very different.254 The justices in the majority received 
contributions to their campaign committees that totaled $115,000 
from the law firm that represented the defendant companies.255 Thus, 
under Sections 3(A) and 5(B) of the model statute, the four members 
of the majority would have had to recuse themselves. Justice Pfeifer, 
a dissenter, would also have to recuse himself because his campaign 
committee received a $5,500 contribution from one of the law firms 
representing the plaintiffs.256 Without the participation of these 
jurists, perhaps Duane Adams would not have felt like the justices 
were “taking a bribe” when the court decided against him.257 
Finally, the model statute offers a practical solution that attempts 
to reduce the administrative inconvenience caused by the increased 
incidence of recusal.258 The exclusions found in Section 6 allow 
judges to continue hearing cases involving their campaign 
contributors provided that there are campaign contributors on both 
sides of the litigation. For instance, if the plaintiff contributed $5,000 
to the judge’s campaign committee and an interest group filing an 
amicus brief on behalf of the defendant also contributed $5,000 to the 
judge’s campaign committee, the judge could still hear the case. 
There is not the same appearance of impropriety in such a situation 
because, regardless of which way the judge rules, he or she is bound 
to disappoint at least one of his or her campaign contributors. 
Furthermore, allowing judges to hear such cases will prevent the 
number of recusals from becoming too onerous for court 
administrators. 
The model recusal statute represents a much more effective 
remedy to the appearance of impropriety created by judges hearing 
cases that involve their campaign contributors. It is a clear 
improvement on the states’ overall silence regarding campaign 
contributions as grounds for recusal. Furthermore, it is more 
comprehensive than the Alabama and California statutes because, 
whereas those statutes only list contributions to a judge’s campaign 
committee as requiring recusal, the model statute also covers 
                                                                                                                 
254 See supra text accompanying notes 9–20. “Different” here does not necessarily mean a 
different result for the parties; rather it means that the process could have had less of an 
appearance of impropriety.  
255 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.  
256 COMMITTEE FOR PAUL E. PFEIFER, ANNUAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE (filed 
Jan. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/pls/cfonline/f?p=119:44:522892284983147::NO::P44_RP_ID,P44_
LISTTYPE:161566,simple (click on “Total Contribution Received”).  
257 Liptak & Roberts, supra note 1.  
258 See infra Part IV.D.1 (analyzing the argument that an increase in recusal will interfere 
with judges’ duty to hear cases).  
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independent expenditures. Thus, adopting the model statute would 
reduce the perceived influence of campaign money in the courtroom 
and consequently would improve the public’s view of judicial 
independence.  
D. Rebutting Potential Criticisms 
Critics could raise several objections to the judicial presumption 
and model statute that this Note proposes. The most prominent 
objections would be: (1) that both proposals interfere with a judge’s 
duty to sit, (2) that both engage in arbitrary line-drawing, and (3) that 
the model statute blurs the boundaries in the separation of powers and 
is thus ineffective. Each of these objections is discussed and 
ultimately dismissed below.  
1. Duty to Sit 
A potential criticism of the judicial presumption and model statute 
is that such recusal rules would run afoul of the duty to sit, which 
“emphasizes a judge’s obligation to hear and decide cases unless 
there is a compelling ground for [recusal] . . . .”259 Many federal 
courts have recognized the duty to sit on the part of judges in cases 
that are assigned to their dockets.260 The most prominent discussion 
of the duty to sit is found in then-Justice William Rehnquist’s 
memorandum opinion261 explaining his decision not to recuse himself 
from hearing Laird v. Tatum.262 Rehnquist said that the duty to sit was 
particularly important for United States Supreme Court justices 
                                                                                                                 
259 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to 
Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 814 (2009).  
260 See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(noting that “[a] judge is as much obliged not to recuse himself when it is not called for as he is 
obliged when it is”); United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that 
“[a] trial judge has as much obligation not to recuse himself when there is no reason to do so as 
he does to recuse himself when the converse is true”) (citation omitted); Edwards v. United 
States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964) (noting that a judge has a duty to sit when there is 
no valid reason to recuse him or herself); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir. 
1961) (finding that “there is . . . [an] obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself” when there 
is no reason to do so). State courts have also recognized a similar duty in their judicial ethics 
codes. See ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.7 (2009) (enumerating one of a judge’s duties as 
a “[r]esponsibility to [d]ecide”).  
261 Laird v. Tatum (Tatum II), 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (mem.). Rehnquist’s memorandum 
has been described as an “important catalyst” in the development of duty to sit doctrine. 
Stempel, supra note 259, at 817.  
262 408 U.S. 1 (Tatum I) (1972). The case involved plaintiffs’ claim that the United States 
Army was illegally engaged in “surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity.” 
Id. at 2. The Court, in a 5–4 decision (with Rehnquist in the majority), reversed the D.C. 
Circuit’s ruling and dismissed the plaintiffs’ action for lack of ripeness. Id. at 1, 13.  
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because the Court has no mechanism for replacing recused justices.263 
He also claimed that justices should uphold their duty to sit because 
recusal could lead to a split court affirming conflicting opinions in 
companion cases.264 
A further consideration underlying the duty to sit is that recusal 
places administrative burdens upon the court system and other non-
recused judges.265 Recusal “is thought to create significant capacity 
issues for the judicial system and to constitute a threat to the 
efficiency of the system.”266 Indeed, whenever a judge decides to 
recuse himself or herself, he or she requires that another judge take 
over the case, which in turn disrupts the replacement judge’s docket. 
Such shuffling among judicial dockets is even more troublesome due 
to the already-crowded nature of the dockets.267  
Critics of this Note’s proposals are likely to grab onto the 
underlying concern regarding clogged judicial dockets to suggest that 
not only do the proposals harm the duty to sit but they add to the 
problem of judicial inefficiency.268 
The proposals included in this Note do not excessively trample 
upon the duty to sit. Rehnquist’s concern, that United States Supreme 
Court justices should uphold the duty to sit due to the lack of a 
mechanism for replacing recused justices, is not present in most 
states. Most states have procedural rules that provide for the 
replacement of a recused judge.269 For example, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court has promulgated a rule that “[w]hen any justice 
[recuses himself or herself], the Chief Justice or the Acting Chief 
Justice may, in his or her discretion, assign a senior justice, senior 
judge, or circuit judge to service for the [recused] justice.”270 Because 
                                                                                                                 
263 Tatum II, 409 U.S. at 837. Rehnquist was presented with a motion for his recusal 
because he had testified before Congress that he saw no constitutional problems with 
surveillance programs like the one operated by the Army. Id. at 824–25. 
264 Id. at 837–38.  
265 See Stempel, supra note 259, at 820–21 (“The recusal of one judge puts greater pressure 
on judges that are not disqualified . . . . To a degree, the duty to sit . . . is in large part a duty not 
to unreasonably burden fellow judges . . . .”).  
266 Id. at 820. 
267 See Charles F. Hobson, St. George Tucker’s Law Papers, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1245, 1258 (2006) (noting that “[c]logged dockets continue to be a problem . . . ”).  
268 See Bopp & Woudenberg, supra note 108, at 331 (arguing that more demanding recusal 
rules, including the Caperton standard, will “clog the courts . . . with recusal-related 
litigation . . .”).  
269 Indeed, Rehnquist hinted in Tatum II that besides the Supreme Court, most courts have 
replacement mechanisms by noting that federal district courts have such a mechanism. See 
Tatum II, 409 U.S. at 837 (“There is no way of substituting Justices on this Court as one judge 
may be substituted for another in the district courts.”). 
270 W. VA. R. APP. P. 33(h) (2010). See also, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF CAL., THE 
INTERNAL OPERATING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 43 
(2007) (describing the replacement process used by the California Supreme Court to replace 
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state courts have replacement mechanisms, Rehnquist’s concern 
regarding the possibility of a split court affirming conflicting results 
in companion cases also falls away. 
Finally, the critics’ argument that the judicial presumption and 
model recusal statute will create administrative inconvenience is 
unavailing. That argument, at its most basic level, fails to adequately 
account for individual litigants’ right to a “fair trial in a fair 
tribunal”271 and is tone-deaf to the public’s perception of the judiciary 
as lacking independence.272 The courts and the states should not resort 
to the specter of clogged dockets to gloss over the appearance of 
impropriety resulting from judges ruling in cases that involve their 
campaign contributors. Such an argument probably would not provide 
any comfort to a litigant, like Duane Adams, 273 who feels cheated by 
the judicial system, nor would it improve the public perception of 
judicial independence. Thus, criticisms of this Note’s proposals based 
on the duty to sit and administrative convenience should not dissuade 
policymakers and courts from adopting these proposals.  
2. Line-Drawing 
Critics of the judicial presumption and the model recusal statute 
could also seize on the proposals for setting clearly-defined campaign 
contribution thresholds, which they may label “arbitrary.” In support 
of that point, the critics may point out the following scenarios. The 
judicial presumption would attach if the attorney of record donated 
$10,000 to a judge’s campaign committee that spent a total of 
$100,000, but not if the attorney donated $9,999. Similarly, the model 
                                                                                                                 
 
recused judges). The states that do not have such a mechanism should adopt one to ensure that 
the recusal rules articulated in this Note do not create situations in which state supreme courts 
cannot reach the necessary quorum. 
271 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Many courts and commentators have 
concluded that an argument of administrative convenience is insufficient to justify policies that 
trample upon individual rights. See, e.g., INS v. Cadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]he fact 
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”); Jones v. City 
of Ridgeland, 48 So. 3d 530, 538 (Miss. 2010) (citations omitted) (noting with approval the 
above-mentioned quotation); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 81 (1965) (advocating more active judicial review of arbitrary 
administrative decisions because “[w]here constitutional rights are involved . . . the courts have 
said that ‘convenience’ and ‘efficiency’ must yield”); Robert Alan Culp, Note, The Immigration 
and Naturalization Service and Racially Motivated Questioning: Does Equal Protection Pick 
Up Where the Fourth Amendment Left Off?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 821 (1986) (arguing that 
“administrative convenience alone cannot provide [a] requisite compelling state interest” for 
dragnet questioning of immigrants) (footnote omitted).  
272 See supra Part I.C (describing the public’s poor perception of judicial independence).  
273 See supra text accompanying notes 9–20. 
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statute would cover a campaign contribution that was for $2,000.01, 
but not one that was for $1,999.99.  
Again, this argument is unavailing for potential critics of the 
judicial presumption and model recusal statute. First, setting clearly-
defined campaign contribution thresholds is the path taken by the 
ABA in its Model Code of Judicial Conduct274 and four states.275 
Second, specific thresholds provide greater clarity to recusal rules that 
are currently muddled and, consequently, difficult to apply to 
situations involving presiding judges’ campaign contributors.276 
Third, a certain amount of arbitrariness is natural in the area of 
campaign contributions thresholds.277 For instance, every statute 
setting maximum contribution amounts by individuals can 
conceivably be labeled arbitrary.278 Finally, to reduce the appearance 
of impropriety and to improve the public perception of state judicial 
systems’ independence, setting explicit contribution thresholds is 
necessary. Without rules enumerating explicit limits, states have 
failed to consider campaign contributions as possible grounds for 
recusal,279 and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on recusal only 
applies to the “extreme facts” of Caperton.280 Thus, the judicial 
presumption and model recusal statute, and their explicit contribution 
thresholds, should be adopted despite potential objections based on 
alleged arbitrariness.  
                                                                                                                 
274 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2011) (setting an undetermined 
contribution threshold requiring a judge to disqualify himself or herself). 
275 See ALA. CODE §§ 12–24–1, 12–24–2 (LexisNexis 2005) (setting a threshold amount 
for judicial recusal); ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2009) (same); CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(9)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (same); UTAH CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) (2010) (same).  
276 See supra Part II.B.1 (describing various recusal statutes with no specific reference 
made to campaign contributions); see also notes 154–59 and accompanying text (describing 
statutes that attempt to address the issue of campaign contributions, but that are nonetheless 
difficult to apply).  
277 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that contribution 
limits “constitute the . . . primary weapons against the reality or appearance of improper 
influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions”); see 
also id. at 83 (“The line is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left . . . to congressional 
discretion.).  
278 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16–905(A)(2), (4) (2006 & Supp. 2011) (setting $390 
campaign contribution limit for non-legislative, non-statewide candidates); id. § 16–905(B)(1)–
(2) (setting $1,010 contribution limit for non-legislative, statewide candidates).  
279 See supra notes 134–41 and accompanying text (describing difficulties state courts have 
had in applying statutes and judicial codes with no reference to campaign contributions).  
280 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009). See also Hoersting & 
Smith, supra note 108, at 344 (noting that the Caperton Court sought to render its ruling as 
having “no broad precedential value”).  
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3. Separation of Powers 
The final potential criticism that this Note addresses is that the 
model recusal statute harms the delicate balance of power between 
the judiciary and the legislature. One critic has suggested that 
commentators and state legislators are not adequately considering the 
potential that enhanced judicial recusal statues will anger the 
judiciary.281 This anger could lead to the judiciary flatly refusing to 
follow a legislatively-enacted recusal statute or deciding to invalidate 
such a statute as a violation of the separation of powers.282 While this 
objection raises a legitimate point, it fails to appreciate the judiciary’s 
lack of movement on this issue. As such, the objection should not 
prevent the adoption of the model recusal statute. 
Since 1999, the year that the ABA promulgated its first model 
judicial ethics provision on campaign contributions as grounds for 
recusal, 283 only two states have adopted judicial ethics provisions 
based on the model rule.284 Furthermore, two state supreme courts 
have specifically considered and rejected the ABA’s model rule.285 
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court was presented with a petition to 
enact an ethics provision with explicit contribution limits, the court 
reacted by passing rules codifying the view that contributions, by 
themselves, have no effect on recusal.286 Instead of a movement 
toward adopting the model rule, the most notable progress since 2007 
                                                                                                                 
281 See Raftery, supra note 98, at 766 (“Lost amid the discussion, however, has been an 
examination of the legislature’s potential and actual implementation of recusal standards, with 
or without the approval of, or even in open hostility to, the desires of the judiciary.”).  
282 See id. at 780–84 (reviewing instances where state courts have either invalidated or 
refused to follow statutes that fall into the realm of judicial rulemaking).  
283 See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(e) (1999) (stating that a judge 
should disqualify himself or herself where “the judge knows or learns by means of a timely 
motion that a party or a party’s lawyer has within the previous [] year[s] made aggregate 
contributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that is greater than [$] for an individual or 
[$] for an entity]” or which is “greater than is reasonable and appropriate for an individual or an 
entity”).  
284 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 147, at 2–3.  
285 Id. at 4.  
286 Id. The Wisconsin judicial ethics code now provides the following in regards to 
campaign contributions and independent expenditures:  
60.04(7) – Effect of Campaign Contributions. A judge shall not be required to recuse 
himself or herself in a proceeding based solely on any endorsement or the judge’s campaign 
committee’s receipt of a lawful campaign contribution, including a campaign contribution from 
an individual or entity . . . involved in the proceeding. 
60.04(8) – Effect of Independent Expenditures. A judge shall not be required to recuse 
himself or herself in a proceeding where such recusal would be based solely on the sponsorship 
of an independent expenditure or issue advocacy communication . . . by an individual or an 
entity involved in the proceeding or a donation to an organization that sponsors an independent 
communication by an individual or entity involved in the proceeding. 
WIS. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT SCR 60.04(7)–(8) (2010).  
 1/5/2012 2:31:07 PM 
230 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
among state supreme courts has been to codify the muddled Caperton 
standard in judicial ethics codes.287  
This “progress” is neither sufficient nor does it adequately address 
the increasing influence of interest groups and wealthy actors in 
judicial elections. State judiciaries’ track records indicate that they are 
not the most willing partners in attempts to remove the appearance of 
impropriety created by judges hearing cases that involve their 
campaign contributors. In face of the state judiciaries’ inaction, state 
policymakers should pass legislation that removes that appearance of 
impropriety.288  
Potential criticisms of this Note’s proposed judicial presumption 
and model recusal statute are unavailing. This Note’s proposed rule 
changes will not cause serious damage to the doctrine of a duty to sit, 
nor will it advance excessively arbitrary line-drawing, nor will it 
unjustly trample upon the separation of powers. These potential 
criticisms should not prevent courts or policymakers from adopting 
the judicial presumption and model recusal statute.  
CONCLUSION 
State judiciaries with elected judges are under siege by increasing 
amounts of campaign money and independent expenditures spent by 
wealthy litigants, attorneys, and interest groups. As a result, an 
increasing number of state judges are called upon to hear cases that 
involve their campaign contributors. Such scenarios have led a sizable 
portion of the public to view state judiciaries as lacking sufficient 
independence, which harms their very legitimacy. Thus, the 
appearance of impropriety created by judges hearing cases that 
involve their campaign contributors and its negative impact on the 
public’s perception of judicial independence is a serious problem. 
                                                                                                                 
287 See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 147, at 6–11 (noting that seven states have 
either impliedly or explicitly codified the Caperton standard in their judicial ethics codes). 
288 It has been suggested that courts could “co-opt” the model statute’s adoption (or others 
similar to it) by “tak[ing] the legislature’s interest in [removing the appearance of impropriety 
caused by judges hearing cases that involve their campaign contributors] and internaliz[ing] it as 
a matter of judicial policy, practice, or rules.” Raftery, supra note 98, at 779. Indeed, this is the 
method adopted by several states and commentators. See ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 
2.11(A)(4) (2009) (requiring a judge to recuse himself by motion of a party that the judge 
received a contribution from a party in the case); UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(4) 
(2010) (requiring judicial recusal if a judge learns by motion of another party that the judge 
received more than $50 from one of the parties); Glaberson, supra note 144, at A1. If courts 
follow this path, that is a positive development and it would have the same effect as enacting the 
model statute that this Note proposes. Thus, it is not inconsistent with this Note’s position. 
However, based on the state judiciaries’ lack of progress in this direction, relying on them to 
change their policies is somewhat naïve. This is especially true when one considers that 
requiring state judiciaries to change internal policies would mean asking elected judges to take 
actions that would dramatically change how they raise campaign money.  
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Consequently, policymakers and courts must take action to remedy 
that public perception by reducing the incidence of judges hearing 
cases that involve their campaign contributors.289 
Current recusal rules have failed to adequately reduce the 
incidence of judges hearing cases involving their campaign 
contributors. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on recusal, 
including Caperton, is ill-defined and remains muddled. Meanwhile, 
state ethics provisions and statutes suffer from a variety of 
deficiencies. Many fail to even mention campaign contributions by a 
litigant, attorney of record, or interest group as possible grounds for 
recusal. Others codify the Caperton standard or other vague language 
that classify campaign contributions as possible grounds for recusal, 
but these provisions are still difficult to apply. Some states have 
enacted provisions that require judicial recusal if the judge has 
received a certain level of contribution from either a litigant or an 
attorney of record. These states’ provisions only reach part of the 
influence of campaign money in the courtroom since they do not 
cover contributions by interest groups whose interests are implicated 
in a case. Furthermore, none of these provisions even cursorily 
address independent expenditures’ effect on judicial campaigns. 290 
The sum of this case law and statutory treatment is that recusal’s 
potential for enhancing the public perception of judicial independence 
is unrealized. This is especially troublesome because other prominent 
proposals for protecting judicial independence are either ineffective 
or impractical.291 In light of recusal’s potential to reduce the number 
of scenarios in which judges hear cases that involve their campaign 
contributors and the deficiencies of other proposals, the Supreme 
Court and state policymakers must adopt more clearly defined and 
expansive recusal rules.  
The Supreme Court can create a more clearly defined recusal rule 
that reaches less “extreme” facts than those present in Caperton292 by 
adopting a judicial presumption that guides the Court in future recusal 
cases. Essentially, unless the non-moving party shows contrary 
evidence, the Court should find that recusal is appropriate if a litigant, 
its attorney, or an interest group filing an amicus brief in support of 
one party provided a substantial contribution or independent 
expenditure to the judge hearing the case.293 This presumption makes 
                                                                                                                 
289 See supra Part I (defining the problem of judicial campaign contributions).  
290 See supra Part II (detailing state legislatures’ and courts’ efforts to curtail judges 
hearing cases involving campaign contributors).  
291 See supra Part III (rejecting various proposals for judicial recusal reform).  
292 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009). 
293 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the Caperton standard as it applies to this proposal).  
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Caperton operational and it allows for the Court to apply its recusal 
jurisprudence in more normal situations besides those where a litigant 
provided $3 million to one of the judges on the bench.294 
Finally, the states should augment the Court’s presumption by 
adopting a model recusal statute that explicitly lays out contribution 
and independent expenditure levels that require the recusal of a judge 
who hears cases that involve his or her campaign contributors. Such a 
statute could potentially receive widespread support among 
policymakers of various ideologies and backgrounds. It would also be 
effective in reclaiming the public’s perception of an independent 
judiciary because it would reduce the incidence of judges hearing 
cases that involve their campaign contributors.295 Furthermore, it 
would not trample upon judges’ duty to sit, it would not engage in 
arbitrary line-drawing, and it would not upset the balance between 
state legislatures and state judiciaries that have been unwilling 
partners in the movement towards stronger recusal rules.296  
Improving and strengthening this nation’s recusal rules will be 
difficult, and criticism will surely arise.297 But, mere difficulty should 
not deter action that is necessary for reclaiming the public’s 
confidence in the judiciary. Indeed, leaving the current state of 
recusal law undisturbed will do nothing but perpetuate the practice of 
judges hearing cases that involve their campaign contributors and 
continue the declining public perception of judicial independence. 
That is an unacceptable result and the possibility that it could occur 
should galvanize judges and policymakers to consider adopting 
solutions like the judicial presumption and model statute outlined in 
this Note. 
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294 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. 
295 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the benefits of the proposed model statute).  
296 See supra Part IV.D (discussing potential criticisms of the proposals in this Note). 
297 See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269–72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (raising 40 questions 
about the Caperton majority’s recusal standard); see also supra Part IV.D (outlining potential 
criticisms to this Note’s proposed solutions).  
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